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1. INTRODUCTION

Normative

legal systems

have struggled

to define

international property rights.
This struggle has been
particularly intense in the area of intellectual property
because the level of protection afforded to trademarked goods
varies tremendously from nation to nation.1
Thus,
international trade often leads to infringement of domestic
property rights. The tension between the global mobility of
goods and intellectual property rights creates significant
economic and legal trade-offs. This Article will analyze these
tensions in the context of gray market goods (i.e., parallel
imports), utilizing U.S. intellectual property law as the
framework for the analysis.
The gray market arises when goods bearing identical
trademarks are sold at different prices in two different
geographical regions.' Because of the price difference, there
are incentives for an arbitrageur to buy goods in the market
with the lower price and resell those goods in other markets at
higher prices (assuming transportation costs are not

"B.A. (1984), Amherst College; M.A., Ph.D (Economics, 1988), University
of Michigan; J.D. (1994), Stanford Law School. The author would like to
thank John Barton, Paul Goldstein, A. Mitchell Polinsky, and participants
in the Stanford Law and Economics "Free Lunch" Series and the George
Mason Law School Faculty Seminar Series for helpful comments on previous
drafts of this Article. Any errors of legal or economic substance are of
course my own.
1 See GATT Activities 1987, 40-42, 130-31 (1988) (discussing differences
in international intellectual property rights protection); Symposium: TradeRelated Aspects ofIntellectualProperty,22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 223, 689
(1989) (same). See also United States International Trade Commission,
Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the Effect on U.S.
Industry and Trade, Report to the Trade Representative, Investigation No.
332-245, under § 332(g) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (1988) (comparing
intellectual property regimes globally).
2 See SETH E. LIPNER,
THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF GRAY
MARKET GooDs 1-2 (1990) (defining gray markets and comparing gray
market goods with black market goods).
(373)
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prohibitive).
When faced with competition from gray
marketeers, owners of the trademark and distributors of the
product in the high-priced region have obvious economic
incentives to prohibit the entry of gray market goods. Since
trademark law protects the use of a trademark on a particular
product in a specific geographic area, trademark owners argue
that the use of the trademark on the gray market goods is
unauthorized and therefore infringes their proprietary rights.'
Distributors of the product argue that the goods are sold
through unauthorized distribution channels and that gray
marketeers unjustly benefit from the advertising provided by
authorized distributors and the goodwill developed by
trademark owners and distributors.4
Finally, consumer
advocates are divided on the issue; some argue that gray
market goods are inferior because they are not sold with the
same warranties and quality assurances as authorized goods.'
Conversely, other consumer advocates argue (with the support
of gray marketeers) that consumers benefit from lower prices
and that the market is improved by gray market competition.'
This Article assesses each of these arguments from an
economic perspective and concludes that the most efficient
result is to permit gray market goods that have alternative
labels." Such a result allows consumers to benefit from lower

' Numerous authorities have presented this argument regarding the
economic effects of gray markets on goodwill. See, e.g., Paul Lansing &
Joseph Gabriella, ClarifyingGrayMarket Gray Areas, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 313,
315-16 (1993) (discussing of the effects of gray markets on goodwill).
" See Lars H. Liebeler, Note, Trademark Law, Economics and Grey.
Market Policy, 62 IND. L.J. 753, 756-57 (1987) (equating gray marketeers
with free riders).
5
See, e.g., Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Counterfeit Goods, 29
J.L. & ECON. 211, 228-29 (1986) (presenting the economic arguments that
gray markets and trademark infringements harm consumers); William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, TrademarkLaw: An Economic Perspective, 30
J.L. & ECON. 265, 308-09 (1987) (same).
' See, e.g., Harry Rubin, Destined to Remain Grey: The Eternal
Recurrence of ParallelImports, 26 INT'L LAW. 597, 618-22 (1992) (arguing
that consumers benefit from gray markets).
' The recommendation of alternative labels has been made by several
other authorities. See Lipner, supra note 2, at 178-79. This Article goes
beyond advocating for alternative labels and presents an economic analysis
that examines the potential gains from gray marketing and compares
various policy responses. But see Higgins & Rubin, supra note 5, 211-30
(presenting an economic model of gray markets that focuses on the status
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss3/2
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prices while protecting the value of the trademark and brand
advertising, a major concern of trademark owners and
distributors.
1.1. Introduction to Gray Markets
Current economic discussion of gray marketing has focused
solely on the economic losses associated with parallel imports.
For example, one recent study estimated that in 1987, lost
sales from parallel imports amounted to $10 billion, or roughly
3% of total U.S. non-petroleum imports in 1987.8 Industry
breakdowns show that estimated lost net sales in the
photographic equipment industry were roughly $48 million in
For cosmetics, the
1982 and $58 million in 1983.'
corresponding figures were $46 million and $67 million; for
watches and clocks, $22 million and $32 million
respectively.'0 A similar study of the semiconductor industry
reports that "the gray market makes up about $5 billion of the
$85 billion worldwide semiconductor market."" There are,
however, no estimates for gains to consumers from gray
marketing and little information on how trademark returns
are affected. Given current research, it is difficult to compare
the benefits from gray marketing with the economic and
litigation costs incurred in preventing gray marketing."
For example, consider Lansing and Gabriella's illustration
They utilize the
of the gray market phenomenon.'"
aspect of trademarks).
" See David A. Gerber & David Bender, CourtsHelp ClearUp Legal Haze
Regarding Gray Market Goods, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 12, 1992, at S5. These

figures are consistent with numbers reported in John K. Armstrong & Alfred

S. Farha, The Gray Market, 1994: Recent Decisions Provide New Basis For
Halting UnauthorizedImports, 7 N.Y. INTL LAW REV. 127-28 (1994). The
data concerning imports and percentage of imports is based on trade
information reported in ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT (1993).

' See E. John Krumholtz, The United States Customs Service's Approach
to the Gray Market: Does It Infringe on the Purposes of Trademark
Protection?,8 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MARKET. L. 101, 114 (1986).
* See id.
* Robert L. Scheier, The Gray Matter, 11 P.C. WK., Mar. 14, 1994, at
Al.
"' See Brian W. Peterman, The Gray Market Solution: An Allocation of
Economic Rights, 28 TEX. INT'L L.J. 159, 170-76 (1993) (presenting a nonquantitative discussion of economic costs).
" See Lansing & Gabriella, supra note 3, at 316.
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unauthorized sale of IBM personal computers ("PCs") as an
illustration of goods which are often sold on the gray market,
often by means of mail order or unauthorized retail
distributors.' 4 These gray market PCs usually are sold
without the warranties and quality assurances provided by
authorized distributors. When customers complain about their
gray market PC and demand that the product be repaired,
IBM "refers such customers to shops that perform both in and
out-of-warranty repairs" in order to maintain its goodwill. 5
In this way, gray marketeers free ride on IBM's goodwill and
service while customers benefit from lower PC prices.
Nevertheless, gray markets also can provide a needed
arbitrage function and serve to integrate globally separated
markets. In the semiconductor industry, for example, industry
insiders report that "independents are taking on a far more
respectable role. They are filling a need every bit as legitimate
and necessary as the traders who work the pits on the Chicago
Board of Trade."' 6 NECX, a semiconductor independent in
Peabody, Massachusetts, provides illustration. By operating
in the gray market, NECX is able to "do a better job balancing
supply and demand than franchised distributors... . The
reason: It has the most current and complete information
about who's paying what price for what component-gleaned
from more than 4,000 incoming phone calls and faxes per
7
day."1
Assessing the impact of gray marketing requires
understanding the causes of the gray market. The threshold
question is: Why do prices differ by region? Advocates of the
gray market argue that international price differences reflect
monopoly power in certain markets and emphasize the role of
gray marketeers in breaking down prohibitive and possibly
illegal barriers to trade.' 8
Furthermore, even if the
restrictions are not based on market power, advocates of gray
marketing contend that gray marketeers provide an arbitrage

"See id.
's Id. (footnote omitted).
16 Scheier, supra note 11, at Al.
17 Id.

"sSee, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Trademarks,PriceDiscriminationand the
Bureau of Customs, 7 J.L. & ECON. 45, 53-60 (1964) (arguing that gray
markets promote free trade).
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function, 1 9 ensuring global equalization of prices and
harmonization of markets. Even if it does not arise in
response to market power, they argue, gray marketing
provides the economically beneficial function of ensuring that
goods are distributed in an efficient manner to parties who are
willing to pay the most for them.
Opponents of gray marketing interpret the same economic
data in a different way. The international differences in prices
reflect not an attempt to segment the market unnaturally, but
rather they arise from differences in tastes, technologies, and
government regulations. 0 More importantly, to the extent
that territorial division of the global market leads to pricing
above marginal cost in each market, consumers benefit from
better services and assurances of quality provided by firms
investing in warranties and trademarks.2 " The excess profits
that arise from territorial division and restricted competition
are not siphoned off as rents but are used to improve the
quality of goods purchased by consumers. 2 Gray marketing,
however, reduces the size of such rents by providing price
competition and consequently erodes the ability of
manufacturers and distributors to provide better quality
products.
Both proponents and opponents of gray marketing ignore
the costs associated with permitting or combatting such
markets. Advocates of gray marketing also ignore the
transportation costs associated with cross-hauling goods to
While unprohibited gray
another geographic market."
"' LIPNER, supra note 2, at 8.
20 Peterman, supra note 12; Lansing & Gabriella, supra note 3..
21 Liebeler, supra note 4, at 755; LIPNER, supra note 2, at 2. See also
Higgins and Rubin, supra note 5 (establishing the economic analysis for
Liebeler's and Lipner's arguments); Landes & Posner, supranote 5 (same).
22 See JOHN BEATH & YANNIS KATSOULACOS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION (1991) (demonstrating the economic theory
behind this proposition); LoUIS PHLIPS, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT
INFORMATION (1988) [hereinafter THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT
THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE
INFORMATION] (same); LOUIS PHLIPS,
THE ECONOMICS
OF PRICE
DISCRIMINATION
(1981) [hereinafter
DISCRIMINATION] (same); and JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION (1988) (same).
23 See James Brander & Paul Krugman, A ReciprocalDumpingModel of

International Trade, 15 J. INT'L ECON. 313, 313 (1983) (discussing the
economics of cross-hauling in the context of international trade).
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marketing will lead to lower prices in the high-price market,
prices in the market from which gray market goods are
purchased should rise. Therefore, consumers in the foreign
source market have a competing interest to reduce gray
marketing just as consumers in the receiving market have an
incentive to promote it. Advocates of gray marketing generally
fail to address the question of how to balance these two
conflicting interests.
Similarly, opponents of gray marketing do not consider the
litigation and administrative costs of curtailing the gray
market. These require funding not only a customs service to
implement border controls against offending goods, but also a
court system to decide challenges brought against gray market
prohibitions. The latter cost is particularly troublesome
because it is often impossible to prosecute the gray marketeer
herself.24 In most cases, the gray marketeer sells restricted
goods to an unauthorized outlet such as K Mart or Sam's
Wholesale Club. Authorized distributors and trademark
owners are therefore forced to litigate against a party that is
several steps removed from the original distribution and sale
of the goods in an overseas market. The unanswered question
for opponents of gray marketing is whether the added
bureaucratic costs needed to prohibit gray market goods is
offset by consumer gains in quality and services.
U.S. companies have sought to combat gray markets in
three ways: (1) through administrative actions against the
Customs Service; (2) through administrative actions before the
International Trade Commission ("ITC"); or (3) through civil
actions against unauthorized domestic retailers. For reasons
to be discussed in greater detail below, actions before the ITC
have been unsuccessful. Actions against the Customs Service
have been based on the theory that the Service did not fulfill
4

Domestic trademark owners have brought contract claims against gray
marketeers in only two reported cases: Railway Express Agency v. Super
Scale Models, Ltd., 934 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1991); DEP Corp., v. Interstate
Cigar Co., 622 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1980). In both cases, the theory was one of
tortious interference with the contractual limitation of territorial division.
In both cases, the plaintiff lost because of a failure to show contract
damages, which was difficult because the domestic owner had extracted its
rents through the licensing arrangement with the foreign distributor. See
Rubin, supra note 6, at 610 (discussing Railwy Express Agency and DEP

Corp.).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss3/2
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its statutory obligations under § 526 of the Tariff Act2 to
prohibit the entry of goods that bore a U.S. trademark.
Actions against the Customs Service are currently judged
according to the standards enunciated in K Mart Corp., v.
Cartier,Inc.,26 a 1988 U.S. Supreme Court case that based
the legality of gray marketing on the relationship between the
domestic company claiming infringement and the foreign
company from which the gray market goods were purchased.
Specifically, the Court held that the Customs Service can allow
gray market goods into the country if the companies involved
are in a parent-subsidiary relationship. If the two companies
are in a licensor-licensee relationship, however, the Customs
Service must restrict the gray market goods from entering into
the country. Therefore, the legality of gray marketing under
§ 526, according to this formulation, depends exclusively on
the relationship between the U.S. trademark owner and the
foreign entity from which the gray market goods are
purchased.
The corporate relationship test applies only to legal claims
brought against the Customs Service. Since the K Mart
decision, U.S. companies that are parents or subsidiaries of
foreign companies have attempted to expand other doctrines
in order to obtain protection from gray marketeers. Their
three principal sources of protection have been §§ 42 and 43 of
the Lanham Act, 7 which prohibit the importation of
trademarked goods; § 602 of the Copyright Act,2" which
prohibits the importation of copyrighted works; and state
labelling laws of New York State and the State of California,
both of which impose disclosure requirements on gray market
goods. Although these statutes provide U.S. companies with
causes of action against unauthorized retailers, such claims
have met with mixed success. While this doctrine seems to
protect companies from sales of gray market goods that are
materially different from their domestic counterparts, its
boundaries are nevertheless unclear.
Therefore, the most concrete legal protection against gray

25

Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 526(a), 42 Stat. 858, 975 (amended 1988).

6,486 U.S. 281 (1988).

7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1982).
" 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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marketeers currently hinges on the corporate form of the U.S.
and foreign companies. According to K Mart, the greatest
protection afforded to companies is in a licensor-licensee
relationship (type one cases in which the U.S. firm licenses the
mark from the foreign firm, and type three cases, in which the
U.S. firm is the licensor). No protection, however, is provided
to companies in parent-subsidiary relationships which must
rely on trademark and copyright theories to enjoin
unauthorized retailers and to obtain damages from them.
This focus on corporate relationships raises several
important legal issues. The first is the relevance of a business
relation between the foreign and U.S. companies in
establishing the legality of gray marketing. Logically, this
relationship should be irrelevant, since foreign distributors
never actively engage in gray marketing. Instead, gray
marketeers arise in the after-market, reselling goods originally
distributed by foreign distributors. The Court's distinction
reflects a concern that multinational enterprises could
otherwise recover twice for the sale of the same goods: once
when -the foreign subsidiary or parent sells the goods and
again when the U.S. parent or subsidiary enjoins the gray
marketeer from reselling these products in the U.S. market."9
This is no less of an economic concern in the context of type
three cases. In establishing a licensing fee for its trademark,
a U.S. company includes the expected profit of the licensee in
the foreign market.
Allowing the U.S. company to
subsequently enjoin gray marketeers also results in a double
recovery for the sale of the same goods: first from the capture
of foreign profits through the licensing fee and second through
reduced competition in domestic markets.3 0 Contrast this
scenario with the type one case in which the U.S. company
licenses a mark from a foreign company. In this situation,

23 Although the U.S. Supreme Court never directly expressed this
rationale, commentators have explained the decision in this way. See, e.g.,
Heon Hahm, Gray Market Goods: Has a Resolution Been Found?, 81
TRADEMARK REP. 58, 58 (1991). See also N. David Palmeater, Gray Market
Imports: No Black and White Answer, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1988, at 89
(discussing the K Mart decision).
"0Surprisingly, this point has not been made in any of the literature on

gray marketing. See Hahm, supra note 29, at 58 (criticizing the distinction
made by the K Mart court); Palmeater, supra note 29, at 89 (same).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss3/2

1994]

GRAY MARKETS

gray marketing results in a double loss for the U.S.
company."' First, part of its profits in the sale of the goods
are taken by the foreign company in the form of a license fee;
second, another part of its profits are diverted by the gray
marketeers. Arguably, in order to be consistent with the
Court's fear of a double recovery, type one scenarios should be
the only situation in which gray marketing should be
disallowed.
This artificial distinction between a multinational
enterprise on the one hand and a licensor-licensee relationship
between foreign and U.S. companies on the other is reflected
in the second legal issue raised by the analysis of gray
markets: a misleading distinction between property and
contract as protection against gray marketeers. 2 In both
type one and type three scenarios, the Court assumes that the
U.S. entity has a protected property interest that cannot be
infringed by gray marketeers. In type two cases, however, the
Court seems to insist that the U.S. company protect its
interests through contract. In type two cases, if gray markets
do divert profits from the U.S. market, the U.S. subsidiary or
parent can negotiate its share of profits with the foreign
parent or subsidiary. In fact, the parent and subsidiary can
always contract in order to preempt the gray market from
occurring at all. Arguably, the same contract protection could
be used in the type one and three scenarios to establish the
license fee.
Therefore, the Court's artificial distinction
between multinational enterprises and licensor-licensee
arrangements is reflected in another artificial distinction
between property and contract protection.
Finally, the legal analysis is further complicated by the
particular source of law for the Court's protection of property
interests. Traditionally, protection against gray marketing
has been found in trademark law. More recently, however,
gray market plaintiffs have sought relief based on theories of
The Supreme Court does compare type one and type two scenarios in
the K Mart case itself. See 486 U.S. at 286. Neither the Court nor any
subsequent commentators have worked through the economic analysis.
8 This distinction between property and contract protection is a sub-text
in many of the gray market cases, as will be apparent through the
discussion of the various cases. Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits:
Torts, Restitution, andIntellectual Property,21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449, 449-52
(June 1992).
81
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state unfair competition law, § 43 claims under the Lanham
Act, and federal copyright laws. Each of the theories behind
these claims reflects a particular conception of the property
interest that is being protected. More importantly, many
courts utilize the principles of intellectual property laws to
further antitrust objectives, and more problematically, to
extend the reach of the intellectual property laws to areas that
would not be addressed by the antitrust laws."3 For example,
in several of the cases discussed below, the Court has held
that the gray marketeer does not infringe a domestic
trademark because an injunction against the gray marketeer
would lead to increased market power of the domestic
trademark holder. Neither § 42 of the Lanham Act nor § 602
of the Copyright Act includes antitrust rationales as a factor
in the grant of protection for intellectual property rights.
Given these conflicting rationales, the legal issue is one of
reconciling the direction of the courts with the original
legislative purpose behind the arguments for both the relevant
intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws. This Article
takes a unique approach to the gray market problem by
providing a formal economic analysis of gray markets. The
purpose of the analysis is to assess both the arguments for and
against gray markets and the particular policy responses of
courts and legislatures. This analysis is useful because it
addresses the following questions that have arisen in almost
all prior gray market research:
(1) What is a possible economic explanation for gray
marketing?
(2) To what extent is gray marketing a result of
differences in intellectual property protection for
trademark?
(3) To what extent are consumers benefitted by gray
marketing?
(4) Should gray marketing be addressed by property or
33 See Dam, supra note 18, at 57 (discussing the use of intellectual
property laws as a means of attacking antitrust violations); Rubin, supra
note 6, at 614 (same).
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contract law?
(5) Are there less restrictive alternatives to those
proposed by the two extremes of the gray market
debate?
This Article presents an economic model that answers
these questions. The model is built from first principles with
an analysis of the role of trademarks. It explains how gray
markets can arise from territorial divisions in the use of a
trademark. Within the context of this model, some general
conclusions of how gray marketing benefits consumers and
how best to address the gray marketing problem can be
established. This Article concludes by proposing that the most
appropriate means of dealing with gray marketing is through
disclosure laws and the use of secondary trademarks.
The ultimate test of this economic analysis is its ability to
rationalize the principal gray market cases. The next Section
of the Article, summarizes the current state of gray market
jurisprudence and emphasizes the major decisions in this area.
After presenting the economic analysis in the third Section,
the Article concludes in the final Section by assessing this
model in light of the case law.
2. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF GRAY MARKETING

2.1. Universality and TerritorialityTheories of Trademark
The law on gray marketing in the United States has
reflected a conflict among manufacturers seeking both
protection for their trademark and distribution channels, free
trade advocates, and consumer interests. The result is a body
of law that offers limited and often conflicting protection from
gray marketing. In contrast, the European Economic Union
has adopted a very liberal approach to gray marketing through
Articles 30, 36, 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. 4 Articles
30 and 36 generally prohibit "quantitative restrictions on
imports and all measures having equivalent effects," but allow
some restrictions in order to protect "industrial and
3

4 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EU
TREATY] [hereinafter TREATY OF ROME], arts. 30, 36, 85 & 86 (as amended
1990).
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commercial property." 5 Restrictions for property protection,
however, cannot be a mere shield for arbitrary discrimination
against foreign goods. Articles 85 and 86 are the major
antitrust provisions and have been utilized to prohibit private
actions that limit parallel trade. 6 One commentator has
described the goals of these provisions as follows: "The
underlying principle of this competition policy is to allow the
consumer to buy at the cheapest possible cost, but the effect is
to enable a trader to trade across frontiers outside authorized
distribution channels."3 7
What is missing from this calculus is protection for the
creation of trademark and goodwill.
This protection is
accorded by other provisions that prevent counterfeit goods
and attempt to confuse consumers through use of misleading
and deceptive tactics.3 8 The EU permits gray market goods
while restricting counterfeit goods. In the United States,
however, the line between gray market and counterfeit goods
is often blurred, as evidenced by the material difference test
discussed below.
In the United States, the controversy over gray market
goods stems from a conflict between two different theories of
trademark rights:
the universality theory and the
territoriality theory.39 Under the universality theory, the
purpose of a trademark is to mark the origins of goods and
thereby to extend a trademark owner's rights globally.40 An
important corollary to the global protection of property rights

3 Id. arts. 30 & 36.
See id., arts. 85, 86. See Michael Remington, Comments on K Mart v.
Cartier:Gray Market Trade and EEC Law, J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1988, at
94-99 (1988) (discussing articles 85 and 86).
' Richard L. Moxon, PiracyandGray Markets in the EuropeanEconomic
Community, 10 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1089, 1090 (1988) (citation
36

omitted).
8 The European Community Council of Ministers has adopted Directive
89/104, which seeks to harmonize trademark law among the member states.

Council Directive 89/104, 1989 O.J. (L40) 1. The European Court of Justice
has addressed the issue of intellectual property right infringement through
Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome.
" See Hahm, supra note 29, at 58 (presenting an excellent survey of the
history of gray market goods cases); Brian D. Coggio et al., The History and
Present Status of Gray Goods, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 433 (1985) (same).
40 See LIPNER, supra note 2, at 141 (discussing the history of the
universality theory).
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss3/2
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is the idea of the exhaustion of rents. Once trademark owners
sell goods in commerce, they lose all further rights in the
trademark.
Therefore, under a universality theory a
trademark owner would not have any rights against a gray
marketeer after the initial sale of the trademarked good.
The leading case illustrating the universality theory is
Apollinaris Co., Ltd., v. Scherer.4
In Apollinaris, a U.S.
company obtained the right to sell its mineral water under the
name of a Hungarian company. A German importer
subsequently imported into the United States the mineral
water produced overseas by the Hungarian company, also
bearing the name of that company. The court held that there
was no infringement of the U.S. trademark licensee's rights
because the goods were genuine. In other words, the German
importer was not passing off counterfeit goods under the
licensed trademark. Apollinaris illustrates not only the
universality theory but also the tension in gray market cases
between property rights in the mark and passing-off. One
commentator stated that cases like Apollinaris are "premised
largely upon the concept that the property interests in the
trademark originate in the product itself-the quality and
physical essence of the product-as opposed to the market
share and the reputation it creates in the consumer's mind."'
In contrast, the territoriality theory posits trademark
rights in a particular region and in the goodwill created by the
trademark owner in the regional sale of the product. 43

A

trademark could have separate legal existence in each country
under the laws of that country. The principal case illustrating
the territoriality theory is A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel,4
in which a U.S. company had licensed the right to use the
name of a French face powder company to sell powder in the
United States. As in Apollinaris, an importer subsequently
imported the French product into the U.S. market. The lower
court held for the importer and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the appeals court in Katzel
and for the first time articulated a territorial principle of
41

27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).

4"Hahm, supra note 29, at 62-63.
43 See LIPNER, supra note 2, at 14 (discussing the history of the
territoriality theory).
44 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
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trademarks. The majority wrote:
It is said that the trade mark here is that of the French
house and truly indicates the origin of the goods. But
that is not accurate. It is the trade mark of the
plaintiff only in the United States and indicates in law
... that the goods come from the plaintiff although not

made by it. It was sold and could only be sold with the
good will of the business that the plaintiff bought.45
Under this theory, trademark rights are ultimately grounded
in associated goodwill and are not independent and global
property rights.
At the same time as Katzel, and in response to cases in
which the courts had espoused the universality theory,
Congress passed § 526 of the Tariff Act, which became the
principal legislation limiting gray market goods.
The
territoriality rationale is now the most widely accepted theory
of trademark rights and constitutes the philosophy underlying
§ 526 of the Tariff Act. It should be noted, however, that the
remnants of the universality theory still affect gray market
jurisprudence as evidenced in the U.S. Supreme Court's recent
decision in K Mart and subsequent legislative and judicial
responses to that case.
2.2. Section 526 and the Customs Act
The 1988 K Mart decision brought to a close several
decades of confusion surrounding the agency interpretation of
§ 526 of the Tariff Act. In 1922, Congress passed § 526 to
prohibit the importing of any
merchandise of foreign manufacture if such
merchandise.., bears a trade-mark owned by a citizen
of, or by a corporation or association created or
organized within, the United States, and registered in
the Patent Office by a person domiciled in the United
States... unless written consent of the owner of such
trade-mark is produced at the time of making entry.'
This code section enabled the Customs Service to exclude
45 Id at 692.
46

Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 526(a), 42 Stat. 858, 975 (amended 1945).
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imports that bore a trademark registered in the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") by a U.S. citizen or corporation
unless there was written consent for the import of such goods.
In applying the statute, however, the U.S. Customs Service
read two broad exceptions into the Tariff Act: the common
control exception and the authorized use exception.47 Under
the common control exception, imports bearing U.S.
trademarks were permitted entry if they were produced by a
foreign affiliate of a U.S. entity. The interpretation of
"common control" was broad, encompassing not only the
parent-subsidiary relationship but also foreign manufacturing
units of U.S. companies. The second exception for authorized
use was a broad reading of the "written consent" requirement.
It permitted the entry of gray market goods if they originated
from a foreign licensee of the U.S. trademark holder. Each of
these broad exceptions was challenged in K Mart by a trade
group seeking to protect trademark holders' rights by bringing
a claim against discount stores such as K Mart and Sam's
Wholesale Club. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision provided
a mixed victory for the trademark owners by striking down the
authorized use exception but upholding the common control
exception.
The K Mart Court's decision rested on the statutory
interpretation of § 526. Post-Chevron,8 the Court gave great
deference to agency interpretation unless such interpretation
was an unreasonable reading of the statute.4 9 Specifically,
the court held that the "authorized use" exception was not a
valid agency interpretation unless the authorization came
within the written permission requirement of § 526.50
Furthermore, the Court expanded the reading of the "common
control exception" to isolate three types of gray market
situations."'
First, a U.S. company which wishes to distribute the

See 19 C.F.R. §§ 133.21 (c)(2), 133.12 (1993).
,Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
41 See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA
(1992) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions regarding
administrative law in an international context).
'7

I See K Mart, 486 U.S. at 294.
'i See id. at 286-87.
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product of a foreign company; it will typically license the
trademark from the foreign company and manufacture and
distribute the product bearing the foreign trademark. The
U.S. company will typically register the foreign mark with the
Patent and Trademark Office. In this type of case (type one
cases), a gray market arises when foreign goods sell for less
than their U.S. counterparts, and a gray marketeer purchases
the goods overseas and sells them domestically. This is the
classic case of gray marketing. It can be enjoined under U.S.
laws by the U.S. company and is compensable by a
demonstration of damages.
A second gray market scenario arises when the U.S. and
foreign companies are in a parent-subsidiary relationship. In
this case, the U.S. or foreign parent wishes to expand its
geographic market by establishing a subsidiary in the other
country. The subsidiary is given rights in the trademark and
is usually restricted geographically in its sale of the final
product. Once again a gray market arises because of price
differences between the U.S. and the foreign market. Even
though the situation is similar to type one cases, type two
cases have not been found to be actionable under the rationale
that the parent corporation and subsidiary are actually one
corporate entity sharing ownership in the trademark, and that
a trademark owner cannot infringe its own trademark.
Finally, a type three gray market may be created when an
unrelated foreign company buys the right to use a U.S.
trademark for the sale of a similar product. As in the previous
case, prices difference between the U.S. and foreign markets
leads a gray marketeer to purchase the goods overseas and
resell them in the U.S. market. In this case, the sale of the
gray market goods can be enjoined and the U.S. company can
recover damages upon showing a loss of profit.
In type one cases, a U.S. firm buys rights in the use of a
trademark from a foreign firm. According to the K Mart
Court, this is the easiest instance in which to prohibit gray
marketing because the foreign imports infringe on the
domestic goodwill created by the use of the mark in the U.S.
market. Similarly, type three situations, in which the U.S.
company licenses its trademark to a foreign company, also
offer an easy case for prohibiting gray markets; however, there
are some recent conflicts over the first sale doctrine under
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss3/2

1994]

GRAY MARKETS

copyright law."2
The most controversial gray market scenario is the type
two case, in which the U.S. and foreign companies are related.
In K Mart, the Court held that the Customs Service did not
need to restrict gray marketing because of the common control
exception to § 526. The Court's rationale for this ruling was
that if the U.S. and foreign manufacturers are under common
control through a parent-subsidiary or other affiliate
relationship, they are in fact one entity. Any loss in profits to
the U.S. company can be compensated within the multinational corporate entity through the transfer of income.
Furthermore, the Court reasoned that to the extent that § 526
is intended to prevent trademark infringement, it is
meaningless for one corporate entity to infringe its own
trademark.
This distinction by corporate relationship seems to ignore
the fact that gray marketing results from the actions of a third
party unrelated to either of the corporate entities engaged in
licensing or common ownership of the trademark.
The
problem is that it is often impossible to bring claims against
these third parties because once they have brought the goods
into the United States, they sell them to unauthorized dealers
who then sell the goods in the U.S. market.5 " If the U.S. and
foreign companies are engaged in a licensing agreement, the
Court reasons that it is not possible for the two companies to
renegotiate the licensing fee once the gray marketeer has
begun to compete with the U.S. firm. Furthermore, even if the
licensing agreement contains territorial restrictions, the U.S.
company will not have a cause of action for breach of contract
against the foreign licensee or licensor because the gray
market sales are transacted by third parties. Therefore,
allowing causes of action when the relationship is based on a
licensing agreement stems from the lack of contract remedies
against the foreign company by the U.S. company. The Court
reasoned, however, that companies in an affiliate relationship
can transfer profits within the corporate entity in order to
compensate the U.S. subsidiary or parent for any losses

62

See infra section 2.4 (discussing recent conflicts over first sale

doctrine).
53
See supra note 24 and accompanying discussion. See also Rubin, supra
note 6, at 597-98.
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resulting from gray marketing.
The distinction raised by the K Mart court raises three
main issues. First, it seems to violate the territoriality
principle of trademarks. If the U.S. company has territorial
rights to the use of the trademark, its corporate relationship
should be irrelevant to its trademark rights within its
territorial boundaries. As one commentator has said about the
K Mart opinion: "Since corporations in the United States are
now barred from blocking parallel goods imported by affiliated
companies, K Mart seems to indicate that the property
interests in the American trademark are universally owned
when held by a multinational corporation despite territorial
boundaries.""
In other words, the Court seems to have
ignored the implication of the territoriality theory that the
U.S. parent and the foreign subsidiary may have independent
rights in the trademark in their respective geographic
markets.
The remnants of the universality theory that seem to cloud
the decision in K Mart lead to further concerns, as the Court
left unclear exactly how closely the foreign and U.S. companies
have to be affiliated in order to fall under the common control
exception. Evidence suggests that some corporations have
licensed trademark rights to third parties, who in turn license
the rights to the trademark holding corporations' subsidiaries
with the intention of falling out of the common control
exception.5 5 Nonetheless, it is still possible that the net of
common control may be expanded. At issue in the recent Fifth
Circuit case of U.S. v. Eighty-Three Rolex Watches" was
whether a corporation that owned common stock of a foreign
company and that was licensed to use the corporation's
trademark qualified for the common control exception. The
Fifth Circuit held that mere ownership of stock did not qualify
and the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari on
the issue.5

"Hahm, supra note 29, at 78.
s See Krumholtz, supra note 9, at 102. See Richard H. Stern, Some
Reflections in ParallelImportationof CopyrightedProducts into the United
States and the Relationof the ExhaustionDoctrineto the DoctrineofImplied
License, 4 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 119, 122-24 (1989).
56

992 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1993).

" See Sam's Wholesale Club v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 547 (1993).
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The second issue raised by the common control exception
is the rationale for the distinction between licensing and
affiliate relationships. NEC Electronics v. CAL Circuit
Abco, 58 a Ninth Circuit case decided a year before K Mart,
illustrates this point. This case concerned the gray market
sale of Japanese computer chips bearing a trademark owned
by NEC-Japan and licensed to a U.S. company. The lower
court decided that the gray market goods infringed the U.S.
company's trademark under § 43 of the Lanham Act because
certain purchasers thought that the gray market chips were
protected by the same servicing and warranty as U.S. chips;
the Ninth Circuit reversed, relying on a mix of antitrust and
trademark law. The Court noted:
If NEC-Japan chooses to sell abroad at lower prices
than those it could obtain for the identical product [in
the United States], that is its business. In doing so,
however, it cannot look to United States trademark law
to insulate the American market or to vitiate the effects
of international trade. This country's trade-mark law
does not offer NEC-Japan a vehicle for establishing a
worldwide discriminatory pricing scheme simply
through the expedient of setting up an American
subsidiary with nominal title to its mark. 9
The logical question is whether this antitrust rationale is
viable after K Mart, because of the strict protection § 526 is
read to give to gray marketing in the licensing context. There
are no valid reasons why antitrust concerns are more salient
for the parent-subsidiary relationship than for the licensorlicensee relationship."0 Neither the statutory language nor
"810 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 152 (1988).
"810 F.2d at 1511.
, One possible basis for this distinction is that a parent and its
subsidiaries are immune from antitrust liability under § 1 of the Sherman
Act because of the Copperwelddoctrine. Copperweld Corp., v. Independence
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). This doctrine states that a parent and a
wholly-owned subsidiary cannot be considered separate entities for the
purposes of the antitrust laws. This rationale is unsatisfactory, however,
because in many gray market contexts the subsidiary is not wholly-owned,
and the Copperweld doctrine has not been extended to partially-owned
subsidiaries. Furthermore, even if the type of monopolization envisioned by
the Ninth Circuit is not a violation of the Sherman Act, §2 may still provide
a basis for a claim.
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the legislative history of § 526 suggest that it was intended to
further antitrust goals.
Finally, the K Mart court left open the use of passing-off
claims in order to restrict the entry of gray market goods. As
the majority wrote, "[Respondents] also asserted that the
Customs Service regulation was inconsistent with § 42 of the
Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1124, which prohibits
the importation of goods bearing marks that 'copy or simulate'
United States trademarks. That issue is not before us."6 '
This open question has since been addressed in Lever Brothers
Corp. v. United States."2
Because of the permissive attitude towards gray marketing
in the context of parent-subsidiary relations, many companies
have sought relief from other areas of the law where the
principles of K Mart have not been applied. Four specific
areas of the law to which companies have turned include: the
Lanham Act, the Copyright Act, § 337 of the Tariff Act, and
the state labelling laws of New York and California.
2.3. Sections 42 and 43 of the Lanham Act
The use of §§ 42 and 43 claims in the gray market context
has had a lengthy history that has culminated in the recent
D.C. Circuit case Lever Brothers, which addressed some
questions left open by K Mart. Section 42 states:
[N]o article of imported merchandise which shall copy
or simulate the name of... any domestic manufacture,
or manufacturer, or trader, or of any manufacturer or
trader located in any foreign country which, by treaty,
convention, or law affords similar privileges to citizens
of the United States ... shall be admitted to ... the
United States. "3
o 486 U.S. at 290 n.3.
62 652 F. Supp. 403 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd and remanded, 877 F.2d 101
(D.C. Cir. 1989), summary judgment granted on remand, 796 F. Supp. 1
(D.D.C. 1992); aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 981 F.2d 1330
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (see section 2.3 infra for a discussion of Lever Brothers).
See C. Dustin Tillman, Case Note, Lever Brothers Corp. v. United States:An
Expansion of Trademark ProtectionBeyond the Limits of K-Mart Corp. v.
Cartier,Inc., 18 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 685 (1993) (discussing the
history of Lever Brothers).
63 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1946).
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In conjunction with § 42 claims, plaintiffs usually join
claims based on § 43(b) which states that, "[any goods marked
or labeled in contravention of the provisions of this section
shall not be imported into the United States or admitted to
entry at any customhouse of the United States.'
Under
§ 43(b), the criterion is that the sale of the marked goods is
likely to "cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person."e The courts, however, have not been
consistent or coherent in identifying when gray market use of
a trademark is likely to cause confusion.
As an illustration of the confused application of the law
under §§ 42 and 43, consider the examples of Original
66
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Electronics, Inc.,
Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc.,6 and Yamaha
Corp. of Am. v. United States"8 . In Granada,the court found
that Cabbage Patch dolls manufactured overseas and resold in
the U.S. infringed the trademark owner's rights because the
foreign-made dolls were materially different from the originals,
thus violating §43 of the Lanham Act. The basis for the
difference was that the dolls' adoption papers were in
Spanish."9 In Ferrero,the court based its findings of a § 43
violation on the fact that foreign-manufactured TIC-TACs
were materially different because of the caloric content and the
chemical composition."' In contrast, the court in Yamaha
held that there was not an infringement even though the
foreign-manufactured musical equipment did not have
warranties when sold domestically."1 Arguably, the lack of
a warranty is more detrimental to consumers than the
seemingly trivial differences the court found for TIC-TACs and
Cabbage Patch dolls. The court's determination of "material
15 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (1946).
"15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
6 816 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1987).
' 753 F. Supp. 1240 (D.N.J. 1991).
,745 F. Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1990).
64

" 816 F.2d at 73.

753 F. Supp. at 1247.
Yamaha Corp. of America v. ABC Intl Traders, Corp. 703 F. Supp.
1398 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd, 940 F.2d 1537 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S.Ct. 1177 (1992) (holding no Lanham Act violation).
7'

71
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differences" is often confused, focusing on differences in taste
rather than on differences in the quality and the assurances
provided by a trademark.
In fact, the discussion of policy goals in gray market cases
based on §§ 42 and 43 reflects some confusion as to the
underlying purposes of the Lanham Act. For example, in
Monte Carlo Shirt, Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l Corp.," a case
involving the unauthorized sale of foreign manufactured shirts
in the United States by a Korean company, the Ninth Circuit
found no infringement because there was no confusion as to
source in the sale of the gray market goods. The court noted:
The possibility of confusion is one that exists between
distinct products that are similar in appearance and are
marked deceptively. Accordingly, the injury that is
remedied by the trademark cause of action is public
No such
confusion as to source of the goods ....
confusion was possible in this case. The goods sold by
Daewoo were not imitations of Monte Carlo shirts; they
were the genuine product, planned and sponsored by
Monte Carlo and produced for it on contract for future
sale.7
4 the Third
In Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash,7
Circuit reached a similar conclusion but with broader
implications for the role of multinational enterprises and
ownership of trademarks. That case held that the gray market
sale of LLADRO ceramics was not an infringement; the court
based its reasoning on the dual purposes of trademark law:
protection against consumer deception and protection of the
trademark holder's goodwill. The court maintained that
neither of these goals were undermined by the sale of the gray
market goods:
Consumers who purchase Jalyn imported LLARDRO
porcelain [defendant's product] get precisely what they
believed that they were purchasing. For that same
reason, Weil's investment in and sponsorship of its
trademark is not adversely affected because the

707 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1983).
" Id. at 1058 (citation omitted).
74 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1989).
72
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goodwill that stands behind its product is not
diminished
by an association with goods of a lesser
75
quality.
The court's analysis also rested on the fact that Weil Ceramics
was a multinational enterprise:
The only "injury" that we perceive Weil endures is the
uncompensated for benefit that its advertisement and
promotion of the trademark confers upon Jalyn. That
loss to Well is not inconsequential or insignificant. The
remedy for it, however, is not properly found in the
trademark law, particularly not in this case. Moreover,
as we noted earlier, that "injury" is not completely
uncompensated because Weil's parent corporation
profits by the sale of Jalyn abroad. 6
As in the context of type two gray market goods under § 526
of the Tariff Act, gray marketing when the trademark owner
is a subsidiary or parent of a foreign company can better be
remedied by internal redistribution of profits within the
corporate entity.
The Weil court's discussion of injury confuses goodwill with
advertising expenditures. If the purpose of trademark law is,
as the court admits, to protect the goodwill investment of
investors, it a fortiori protects the advertising expenditures,
one of the main ways in which goodwill is created." Given
the multinational enterprise in which Weil was involved,
perhaps a better reading of the court's reasoning is that the
multinational enterprise has already recouped its advertising
investment when the goods were first sold by the parent
corporation overseas. But this reasoning comes dangerously
close to the universality theory that was arguably rejected in
Katzel.
Nonetheless, as in many of the §§ 42 and 43 gray market
cases, courts often underplay the consumer confusion that
results from the sale of gray market goods. In both Weil and
Monte Carlo, the court assumes that consumers would not be
confused by the gray market goods since the goods were

71kd. at 672.
7

"

Ids

See TmROLE, supra note 22 (discussing advertising and goodwill).
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genuine and bore a legitimate trademark. The court, however,
does not address whether the goods were in fact genuine or
whether the consumers were confused. In determining the
issue of genuineness, the court will have to decide the
appropriate baseline by which to determine whether the
foreign and domestic goods are different. Cases like Granada,
Ferrero, and Yamaha demonstrate that differences in
consumer tastes supersede other material differences such as
the use of warranties or assurances of product quality.7 This
test for difference is underscored by Lever Brothers.
In Lever Brothers, a British company, affiliated with a U.S.
soap manufacturer, imported soap products bearing the
trademarks "SHIELD" and "SUNLIGHT" into the United
States. These marks infringed the U.S. trademark rights. The
court held that material differences reflecting varied consumer
tastes can be the basis for §§ 42 and 43 claims and that the
domestic trademark owner can proceed against either private
parties or the Customs Service for alleged Lanham Act
violations.7" Somewhat comically, the court based its finding
of material difference on the factual determination that "U.S.
Shield contains a higher concentration of coconut soap and
fatty acids, and thus more readily generates lather ....
The
manufacturing choice evidently arises out of the British
preference for baths, which permit time for lather to develop,
as opposed to a U.S. preference for showers."" As the most
recent appellate court opinion on §§ 42 and 43 and gray
markets, Lever Brothers provides a test of material difference
based in part upon differences in consumer tastes.
The inquiry under §§ 42 and 43 expands gray market
protection under § 526 beyond the licensor-licensee
relationship, so long as the trademark holder can show
material difference between the domestically manufactured
product and the gray market good. As the cases indicate,
however, the courts' finding of material difference is not
consistent and is often founded on a limited factual basis.
Differences in warranty and quality assurances are overlooked
" The difference between quality and tastes is largely an artificial one.
Quality of goods is a result of differences in tastes. See THE ECONOMICS OF
IMPERFECT INFORMATION, supra note 22, at 23-26.
71 981

F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
80 877 F.2d 101, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss3/2

1994]

GRAY MARKETS

while differences in consumer tastes become determinative.
This has led prospective plaintiffs to look to other theories that
might find stronger and more predictable protection. One
theory has been that of copyright law.
2.4. Sections 109 and 602 of the Copyright Act
Gray market plaintiffs have turned to copyright law for
protection when the infringement is not of a registered
trademark, but involves a design on the product label, an
audio-visual work, or a literary piece. Use of copyright law in
the gray market context may, at first glance, seem contrary to
the policies discussed above. If gray marketeers are allegedly
violating the goodwill of and investment in distinctive
trademarks, then trademark law is arguably the more
appropriate basis for the claim; copyright law is intended to
protect creative efforts. This argument, however, is too
formalistic. The process of creating distinctive marks is as
much a creative effort as writing a novel or a painting picture.
Therefore, extending copyright law to the gray market area is
not as contrary to copyright policy as it would first appear.8 '
The more troublesome problem is the possibility of
copyright law enveloping the domain of trademark law. If
copyright law can be used to protect distinctive marks of
labels, then the limits of trademark law may be undercut.8 2
Specifically, trademark protection requires use in commerce
while copyright law requires that the work be fixed in a
tangible medium of expression. Arguably, if copyright law is
now brought to apply to labels and product names, the
commerce requirements of trademark law could be avoided by
appealing to copyright law. Within the United States, most
courts have not extended copyright protection to advertising
jingles and labels.8 " Perhaps this body of case law will
a' See, e.g., Donna K. Hintz, Note, Battling Gray Market Goods, 57 ALB. L.
REV. 1187 (1994).
"' The main limitations are use in commerce within a specific geographic
boundary. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (6th
Cir. 1918) (discussing these limits in the case law); Dawn Donut Co. v.
Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364-65 (2d Cir. 1959) (same).
8
See Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705 (7th Cir.
1972) (extending copyright protection to the design of a deodorant spray
can); but see Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 431 (1891) (noting that
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provide the limiting principle that defines the boundary
between copyright and trademark law. The potential conflict
between copyright and trademark is the sub-text of the cases
discussed below and is an issue yet to be litigated.
Section 602 of the Copyright Act prohibits the
"[i]mportation into the United States, without the authority of
the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or
phonorecords of a work that have been acquired outside the
United States.""' The section creates exemptions for religious
organizations, the U.S. government, and single copies not
intended for distribution. Section 602 is thought by some to
offer potential plaintiffs a weapon against the gray market.
This theory rests on copyright protection of the label and name
of the product, to which copyright protection applies because
the label and name are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression and are arguably a pictorial or graphic work for the
purposes of § 102, which defines the subject matter of
copyright.8 5 The main limitation on this theory is § 109,
which limits copyright protection to the first sale. 8 Since
gray market goods are being distributed in the after-market
(i.e., they are being resold rather than sold for the first time),
gray marketeers and unauthorized distributors can argue that
the copyright holders do not have rights extending to the aftermarket. Cases that discuss this issue have split evenly, with
Columbia BroadcastingSystem Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distrib.,
Inc."' and BMG Music v. Perez"8 holding for the U.S.
company and SebastianInt'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTM9
Ltd."9 and Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp.9"
"holding for the unauthorized distributors.
In Scorpio, Columbia Broadcasting Systems ("CBS"), a New

copyright will attach to labels if composition serves some function "other
than as a mere advertisement.").

17 U.S.C. § 602 (1976).
or See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
so See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1976).
84

87

569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 738 F.2d 424

(3d Cir. 1984).
s 952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991).
3' 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988).
91 No. 88-0156-A, 1988 WL 167344 (E.D. Va. Aug. 29,1988) overruled in
part,883 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1989).
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York corporation, owned a number of sound recording
copyrights. CBS-Sony, an affiliate of CBS, sold the right to
distribute these recordings in the Philippines Islands to Vicor,
a Philippines corporation. This arrangement allowed Vicor to
use an agent, Rainbow Music, Inc. ("Rainbow") to carry on the
actual distribution. Rainbow subsequently sold copies of these
recordings to International Traders, a Nevada corporation,
which in turn sold to Scorpio, a Pennsylvania corporation,
which then sold the records in the United States. CBS
brought suit against Scorpio under § 602 and Scorpio proffered
a § 109 defense. The Third Circuit held for CBS, stating that
§ 109 "grants first sale protection to the third party buyer of
copies which have been legally manufactured and sold within
the United States and not to purchasers of imports such as are
involved here. The protection afforded by the United States
Code does not extend beyond the borders of this country
....

."'

In other words, the first sale defense only applies to

first sales within the United States. The court's decision
rested on the language in § 109 which restricts application to
copyrighted materials "lawfully made under this title." The
court read "lawfully made" to mean made within the United
States, and as a result concluded that the first sale doctrine
did not extend to goods manufactured and sold overseas. CBS
did not exhaust its rights when its affiliate CBS-Sony made
the sale of records in the Philippines. In BMG Music, an
almost identical factual scenario, the Ninth Circuit followed
the holding of Scorpio, stating that the first sale protection to
gray marketeers does not apply when the U.S. copyright
holder's first sale was made overseas.
In contrast, the courts in Sebastian and Red Baron
interpreted the first sale defense more broadly than either the
Third or the Ninth Circuits. In Sebastian, a California
corporation contracted with a South African corporation to sell
hair care products bearing copyrighted labels bearing the
marks WET and SHPRITZ FORTE in South Africa. The South
African corporation experienced a change of heart unexplained
in the opinion and shipped the unopened containers back to
the United States. The Customs Service released the goods,
which eventually were picked up by Fabric, a U.S. company.

"1 569 F. Supp. at 49.
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The California corporation subsequently sued when Fabric
attempted to sell the products in the U.S. market. Fabric then
raised a first sale defense. This time, the Third Circuit held
in favor of the gray marketeer, arguing that "the place of sale
is not the critical factor in determining whether § 602(a)
governs ... a first sale by the copyright owner extinguishes
any right later to control importation of those copies.""
Despite the contradiction with Scorpio, the court did not
overrule the earlier case nor did it distinguish it. The court
did, however, express some uneasiness over the earlier
interpretation of "lawfully made." The only factual difference
between Scorpio and Sebastian is that in Scorpio, it was the
corporate affiliate who had made the purported first sale,
while in Sebastian it was the corporate copyright owner who
had sold the product. Ironically, reconciling Sebastian and
Scorpio leads to a result that is more protective of the parentsubsidiary relationship in the copyright context than in the
trademark context. As discussed above, U.S. companies that
are parents or subsidiaries of foreign companies from which
the gray market goods originate are not protected from gray
marketing because the trademark is viewed by the courts as
property owned by the parent-subsidiary entity. 8
For
copyright purposes, however, the sale of copyrighted materials
by a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company does not exhaust the
first sale rights of U.S. corporate copyright owners. Therefore,
copyright law arguably provides the resolution to the lacuna
created under § 526 of the Tariff Act and §§ 42 and 43 of the
Lanham Act between parent-subsidiary corporate relationships
and licensor-licensee relationships.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia's
recent decision inRed Baronundercuts the protection provided
by Scorpio by extending the Sebastian rule to a parentsubsidiary context. The practice at issue in Red Baron was
that of buying video game circuit boards in a foreign market
(usually Japan or the United Kingdom) and reselling them in
the United States. The gray marketeer, through this practice,
was able to arbitrage the price difference between the U.S.
video game boards and foreign game boards that arose from

"

847 F.2d at 1099.

93 See supra text accompanying note 28.
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tie-in sales in the U.S. market. In the U.S. market, sales of
game boards were usually tied into the sale of the video game
cabinet; in the United Kingdom and Japan, however, no such
tie-in arrangements exist. 4 As a result, U.S. video game
arcade owners were able to purchase gray market video game
boards and install them into their own cabinets.
By
"unbundling" cabinets and boards, gray marketeers were able
to sell the boards at below the market price for the tied boards
and cabinets.
The actual litigation in Red Baron was brought by Taito
Corporation of Japan, which owned the copyright for the
boards in the United States and had licensed these rights to
its U.S. subsidiary, Taito America Corp. The defendant was
Red Baron, a U.S. company that purchased Taito boards which
operated the video game Double Dragon overseas and sold the
board in competition with the U.S. subsidiary. In defense
against Taito's claim of copyright infringement, Red Baron
raised a first use defense based on the Sebastian case. Taito
distinguished the Sebastian court's holding on the grounds
that Taito had manufactured and sold the boards in Japan, not
in the United States. The court held for Red Baron, reasoning
that the place of sale was irrelevant for the purposes of the
first sale doctrine. The court justified this decision on the
grounds that a contrary ruling would favor foreign companies
holding U.S. copyrights over U.S. companies.95 By making
place of sale irrelevant, the court was attempting to create a
level playing field for foreign and U.S. companies.
The court, however, rejected without comment Taito's
separate argument that the first sale doctrine applied only to
the distribution rights of the copyright holder, but not the
public display and performance rights. This argument has
support in two important Third Circuit cases.96 In deciding
Taito's appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court on
this issue, holding that the first sale doctrine does not extend
to public performance rights. Therefore, Red Baron's parallel
"' For an analysis of the economic arrangement behind the sale of video
games, see Stem, supra note 55, at 121.

"See supra note 87, at 3.
96 See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir.
1986); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d
Cir. 1984).
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importation of the video boards did infringe Taito's copyright.
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on the subsequent
appeal by Red Baron.
Judging from the appellate decision in Red Baron, the
application of copyright law to the gray market problem has
not been fully resolved. The contradictory opinions of Scorpio
and Sebastian, both of which are still good law, suggest that
each side in the gray market debate has precedent for its
opinion. Furthermore, distinguishing Scorpio from Sebastian
on the basis of the parent-subsidiary relationship present in
Scorpio provides some protection for U.S. parent corporations
and subsidiaries who are facing competition from gray markets
that originate from foreign affiliates. This distinction provides
an avenue of protection for parents and subsidiaries whose
rights have been eroded by the development of § 526 and
Lanham Act case law. More interestingly, the Red Baron case
provides a window through which the consequences of
Sebastian can be avoided for manufacturers and distributors
of audio-visual works.
Surprisingly, copyright law has
provided the protection for U.S. companies once provided by
trademark law despite the different policies underlying these
two areas.
Future litigation will undoubtedly test the
elasticity of copyright law and its potential conflict with
trademark law in the gray market context.
2.5. Section 337 of the Tariff Act
The Tariff Act offers additional protection against gray
marketeers in § 337, which regulates unfair practices in
import trade.9
However, this statute provides an
administrative remedy through the ITC and has only been
tested in one case. The use of § 337, as the discussion below
indicates, has been limited by political factors that stem from
an underlying confusion over the proper posture towards gray
market goods. Section 337 restricts: "unfair methods of
competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into
the United States or in the sale of such articles ... by the

97 19 U.S.C. § 337 (1930) as amended by The Tariff Acts of 1974 & 1988.
See John H. Barton, Section 337 and the InternationalTrading System, in
TECHNOLOGY, TRADE, AND WORLD COMPETITION: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY WITH TRADE SANCTIONS (1990) (discussing the provision).
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owner, importer, or consignee . . . the threat or effect or
tendency ' of
which is to destroy or substantially injure an
8
industry.
This Section provides a procedural remedy through the
International Trade Commission, which conducts an
investigation of the alleged conduct and reports to the
President for approval or disapproval of the ITC's
recommended action. The ITC's determination is published in
the Federal Register for notice and comment.
Since the creation of the ITC and the passage of the
current version of § 337 in 1974, only one case, In the Matter
of CertainAlkaline Batteries (hereinafter "Duracell case") has
utilized it as a cause of action.9 Brought by Duracell, Inc.,
the § 337 claim alleged that gray marketeers were buying
batteries from a Belgian subsidiary of Duracell to which the
trademark "Duracell" had been licensed. These batteries were
subsequently sold to unauthorized distributors in the United
States. Although Duracell named fourteen respondents in its
complaint, it had settled with thirteen of them before the ITC
investigation. The administrative law judge found that there
was in fact a violation of § 337 based on trademark
infringement, misappropriation of trade dress, false
designation of origin, and violations of the Fair Packaging and
Labeling Act."
These violations together allegedly caused
"injury to the industry," a showing required for the § 337
claim. The ITC reviewed the ALJ's claim and a majority
affirmed it. The argument of the majority illustrates some of
the major themes that have been discussed above.
One issue that the ITC majority directly addressed was the
claim that Duracell and its Belgian subsidiary were one
international enterprise and therefore Duracell, Inc. had
reaped its fair share of profits from the sale of the batteries in
Belgium. The majority's response is a ters6 restatement of the
territoriality theory:
Duracell has extensively advertised its batteries in the
United States and built up its reputation as a purveyor

s 19 U.S.C. § 337 (1930), (as amended by The Tariff Act of 1974 & 1988).
"See In the Matter of Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. 823 (U.S.

ITC 01984)
[hereinafter Duracell Case].
0
'

Id. at 825.
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of quality batteries.
Because of this reputation,
Duracell is able to sell its batteries at a premium....
Thus, the importers and retailers are appropriating the
benefits of Duracell's goodwill for themselves which
they have not helped to create. This is the essence of
unfair competition and the basis for our finding of
trademark infringement.0 1
Furthermore, the ITC majority held that there was consumer
confusion as to source which further undermined the goodwill
created by Duracell in the U.S. market:
The confusion of the U.S. consumers is not with regard
to the "genuineness" of the batteries ... but as to the
efficacy of the goods to fulfill the U.S. consumer's
reasonable expectations, one of which surely is that the
item being purchased has been given the same care in
production and distribution as were the same
trademarked goods previously purchased and used by
the consumer with satisfaction.0'
As a remedy to gray marketing, the majority recommended a
broad exclusion which entailed either destroying the goods or
shipping the goods back to the country of origin.
The two dissenting ITC commissioners' opinions agreed
that the gray market goods copied the trademark owned by
Duracell and harmed its goodwill, but disagreed on the extent
of consumer confusion. 3 The dissent concluded that there
was no confusion as to source since Duracell, Inc. was initially
the source of both batteries and therefore had control over the
quality of both authorized and unauthorized sales.' 4
Because of the lack of harm to consumer perception, the
dissent recommended that the gray market goods be permitted
into the market but with proper labels indicating them to be
gray market goods. The appropriate remedy would be "proper
labelling which clearly indicates that the two products, while
the same at the point of manufacture, are not similarly
authorized and guaranteed in the United States.... [This

101 Id at 831.
1012Id. at 834.
103

Id. at 849-50.

104

Id. at 852.
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ensures that] the ultimate price of the foreign batteries ...
would then properly reflect the true nature of the imported
product."'
According to the dissent, the goods should be
excluded only if the labelling remedy would prove inadequate
(e.g., if the product were a shirt bearing a company logo).""
While the ITC ruling accorded broad protection against
gray markets, the decision was ultimately made moot by
President Reagan's disapproval of the ITC
recommendation."
The President's ground for disapproval
was the potential conflict with the Custom Service's
interpretation of § 526, which allowed gray market goods in
the parent-subsidiary context under the common control
exception.'
The President stated:
The Administration has advanced the [Customs
Service's] interpretation in a number of pending court
cases. Recent decisions of the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia and the Court of International
Trade explicitly uphold that interpretation. Allowing
the Commission's determination in this case to stand
could be viewed as an alteration of that
interpretation. 09
After the ITC challenged the President's response in federal
court, the United States Supreme Court upheld President
Reagan's disapproval. The result is that § 337 currently
affords no protection against gray marketeers."0
The
reasoning of both the majority and the dissent provide fodder
for future gray market debate and litigation.
2.6. State Labelling Laws
New York State and the State of California both passed
legislation in the mid-1980s intended to prohibit the sale of
goods through unauthorized channels."'
These statutes
105

Id. at 858.

IN Id.

1* See LIPNER, supra note 2, at 179; BARTON, supra note 97, at 32; cases
cited
supra note 83.
1
* See LIPNER, supra note 2, at 95.
l" Id. (alterations in original).
1
Id. at 180.
, See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 218-aa, 368-d (McKinney 1984);
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provide criminal sanctions for unauthorized sales of goods in
the gray market. No case law has developed interpreting
either of these statutes because of the low enforcement rates.
Nonetheless, the two statutory schemes provide a useful
perspective for other policy responses to gray marketing.
Both the New York and California statutes apply to goods
bearing a brand name or trademark and usually sold with a
warranty. Both require the distributor to indicate that the
goods are gray market goods and both statutes allow the
attorney general of the state to enjoin the sale of gray market
goods if the distributor does not properly disclose that the
goods are gray market goods. In addition, the New York
statute penalizes the distributor further by requiring a refund
of all sales within twenty days of purchase if the act is
violated.
The New York and California statutes differ in the type of
information they require to be disclosed. The New York
statute requires the distributor to disclose that the gray
market products: (a) are not accompanied by a manufacturer's
warranty which is valid in the United States; (b) are not
accompanied by instructions in English; and (c) are not eligible
for a rebate offered by the manufacturer. 112 The California
statute requires the disclosure of each of these three items and
in addition information that the product: (a) is not compatible
with United States electrical currents; (b) is not compatible
with United States broadcast frequency; (c) contains parts
which cannot be replaced through U.S. distributorship; (d)
contains accessories not available through U.S. distributorship;
and (e) has other incompatibilities with domestic
standards.'
The two state labelling statutes in effect adopt the remedy
of the dissenting ITC Commissioners in the Duracell case." 4
The issue of adequacy of labelling is addressed through the
requirement that the information be disclosed either on the
product through a tag or label or on a sign near the display for
CaliforniaGray Market ConsumerDisclosureAct, CAL. CIrV. CODE §§ 1793.1,
1797.80-83 (West 1994).
112 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 218-aa, 368-d (McKinney 1984).
11 California Gray Market Consumer Disclosure Act, CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1793.1, 1797.80-83 (West 1994).
14 See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.
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the product. Unfortunately, the enforcement of this statute
has been minimal because of the number of retail outlets, the
small volume of product sales, and the relatively high to the
costs of enforcement.115 The statutes do provide another
alternative to the regulation of gray marketing in the United
States.
2.7. Summary
As this overview indicates, the response to gray marketing
in the United States has not been as liberal as in the
European Union. The result is an overlap of statutory and
case law that reflects conflicting attitudes towards gray
marketing. Three principle themes emerge from the current
state of the law, and these themes will be instrumental to the
understanding of the economics of gray marketing.
First, corporate structure affects the legality of gray
marketing. If the gray market goods originate from a parent
or subsidiary of a U.S. company, a court is less likely to enjoin
the gray marketing or to award damages. In part, this reflects
a view that affiliated companies have more control over the
quality of goods and therefore consumer confusion and harm
is less likely. The conclusion also stems from a conflict
between global markets and the territoriality principle of
trademark law. Trademark recognition reflects the creation of
goodwill and advertising on the national level. This goodwill
is maintained through the creation of authorized distribution
channels. Concluding that gray market goods originating from
foreign, but related, companies do not create confusion as to
source ignores the national differences in goodwill. While it
may be true that the trademarks "IBM" or "Coke" are
recognized globally, computers or soft drinks manufactured in
different countries under different quality standards are not
necessarily substitutes for each other.
The international differences in quality buttress the second
theme of the U.S. law on gray marketing, the court's ability to
discern material difference and consumer confusion over
products. As the recent Lever Brothers case shows, the
material difference requirement of §§ 42 and 43 provide
further protection for U.S. companies against gray marketeers.
"See

LIPNER, supra note 2, at 168-69.
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While § 526 rests on a showing of the authorized use of a
trademark, the Lanham Act accords protection against the
passing off of materially different products as genuine articles.
The problem in applying the Lanham Act is one of determining
what aspects of the product are relevant for determining
difference. It is on this point that the courts have shown the
greatest confusion. Differences in warranty protection have
not been the basis for finding material differences, but
differences in language or instruction have been. The only
meaningful guidepost in the range of Lanham Act cases is that
the courts will look to differences in tastes in order to find that
gray market goods and U.S. manufactured goods are
materially different. Therefore, selling dolls with foreign
language adoption papers, soap that does not lather, and
candies that differ in caloric content would all be bases for
gray market claims, while selling products otherwise identical
except for the provision of warranties would not be
sanctionable.
Finally, the gray market law reflects a confusion as to what
interest should be protected. On the one hand, courts want to
protect a manufacturer's investment in goodwill; on the other
hand, courts seek to protect consumers from confusion. The
tension between these two goals can be seen in the source of
law for the restrictions on gray marketing. While trademark
law protects both the goodwill and consumer interests,
copyright law protects the manufacturer's interest in creating
advertising and creative expression. If copyright law becomes
a more often used source for gray market protection, courts
will have to reconsider the set of interests that gray market
regulation is designed to protect. The debate between the
majority and the dissent in the Duracell case illustrates the
conflict over the appropriate weights to place on the
consumer's and manufacturer's interests. The statutory
solutions provided by New York and California provide one
compromise; the lack of enforcement of these statutes (and
consequent case law to test them) suggest that local and state
regulatory bodies do not find it cost-effective to combat gray
market goods. The confusion at the federal level does not
provide the needed remedy at the state and local levels.
A helpful way to sort through the issues raised by the laws
regulating gray markets is to pursue a more rigorous analysis
of the gray market phenomenon. Given the terms of the
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss3/2

1994]

GRAY MARKETS

debate and the intimate connections with international trade
and consumer welfare, economic tools provide the sharpest
instruments with which to dissect the gray market problem.
3. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF GRAY MARKETS
In each of the gray market cases discussed in the previous
Section, the court was forced to grapple with both the
underlying economics that lead to gray marketing and the
economic consequences of gray marketing. In each case, the
court also failed to balance all of the various economic
interests affected by gray marketing. Part of this failure
resulted from judicial competence: a court can only decide
based on the legal facts before it and does not have the power
or ability to further broader social and economic values.
Congress' inability to pass cogent gray market legislation,
however, and the consequent reliance on federal intellectual
property law illustrates that even the level of government
which is able to take the broader perspective is stymied by the
tensions within gray marketing." 6 Part of the problem is
that no systematic academic study has examined all of the
economic elements of gray marketing. The purpose of this
Section is to fill some of the gaps in the scholarship and to
provide compelling arguments for future legislative action on
the gray marketing issue.
Of course, the economic analysis presented below is framed
by the biases of the model builder."7 But economic and

Congress' attempts to pass legislation to address the gray market
problem have often been frustrated by competing political interests. In May
1987, both the House and Senate considered bills designed to de-regulate
gray marketing by weakening the holding ofKMart. The bills did not make
it out of committee. Similarly, for each term beginning in 1987, Senator
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) has proposed a bill that would extend the holding of
KMart to prohibit gray marketing even in the context of no common control.
In 1991, this bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee but died "due to
pressures from competing interest groups and constituencies." See Rubin,
supra note 6, at 615.
117 The economic analysis discussed below is in the tradition of models
of imperfect competition developed in EDWARD CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY
11

OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (3d ed. 1933) and JOAN ROBINSON, THE
ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION (1933). For a discussion of the

various approaches to modelling market structure, see the essays in NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE (Joseph E. Stiglitz

& G. Frank Mathewson eds., 1986); G.F. Mathewson & R.A. Winter, The
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legal analysis creates its own dialectic, and it is hoped that the
substantive model developed below will be extended and
refined to incorporate other economic and political concerns.
The intention in developing the specific economic model
presented is to incorporate all of the issues that are raised by
gray marketing: trademark and the creation of goodwill,
licensing of trademark, corporate structure, and international
trade. These particular economic issues can be further
generalized into three groups of issues: (1) protection of
intellectual property; (2) price discrimination and territorial
market divisions; and (3) international trade.
3.1. Intellectual Property Rights
Trademark rights protect two economic interests: the
producer's investment in goodwill and product quality and the
consumer's interest in reducing search costs and being assured
of product quality. United States trademark law protects
these rights by allowing trademark owners to enjoin or collect
damages from competitors who use their trademark on a
similar product in a protected regional market. Copyright
law, on the other hand, is designed to protect the creation of
artistic and literary works. The consumer protection aspect of
copyright law is minimal and is reflected in copyright defenses
such as fair use and first sale, which carve out and protect
certain market interests from the copyright owner's property
right. The overlap of copyright and trademark laws in the
gray market area ignores the consumer protection aspect of
gray market legislation. This Article ignores the legal doctrinal differences in the economic analysis of gray markets. For
all practical purposes, what matters is whether gray market
goods are restricted or permitted entry into the domestic
market; the exact legal theory leading to the remedy is
irrelevant to the economic analysis. The use of copyright and
trademark doctrines in the gray market context can be
reconciled if copyright law is viewed as providing protection for
efforts that have resulted in the creation of distinctive marks
and advertising, a point that was discussed in greater detail

Economics of Vertical Restraints in Distribution, in id. at 211. See also
Landes & Posner supra note 5; Higgins & Rubin supra note 5 (providing
alternative approaches).
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in the previous Section.
In this Article, the value of trademark creation is captured
in two ways. First, on the consumer side, trademarks allow
consumers to reduce search costs and to obtain assurances of
quality; these benefits increase the value derived from the
purchase of the trademarked good." 8
Second, on the
producer side, trademarks create localized monopolies in the
19
production of certain goods through brand identification.
This analysis will explicitly capture both of these types of
value.
3.2. Price Discriminationand TerritorialDivisions
Gray markets arise because similar goods bearing
identical trademarks are sold in different geographical
markets at different prices. The price difference provides the
incentive for an arbitrageur to buy in the low price country
and sell in the high price country 2 ° In each of the gray
market cases discussed in the previous Section, the gray
marketeer either absorbed the transportation costs or relied on
the absorption of the costs by a third party. For example, in
Sebastian, the foreign licensee of the trademark absorbed the
costs by re-shipping the products back to the United States,
allowing the gray marketeer to sell the products domestically
without bearing any transportation costs. In other cases, such
as Weil or Scorpio, the gray marketeer absorbed the
transportation costs and passed them on to the ultimate
purchaser. Transportation costs play an important role in
determining when gray markets arise, and therefore must be
explicitly included in any sensible model of gray markets.''
The initial price difference between the domestic and
foreign markets must also be explained. For the purpose of
economic analysis, such differences could be taken as given,
" See Landes & Posner, supra note 5, at 270.
...
See Martin K. Perry & Robert H. Groff, Trademark Licensing in a
MonopolisticallyCompetitive Industry, 17 RAND J. ECON. 189 (1986).
2 Liquor distributors in the U.S. testified before a House Subcommittee
that the price difference between identical cases of scotch sold in the United
States and in Canada was as high as $56 in 1986. HEARING BEFORE THE
SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE,

99th Cong., July 29, 1986, 151-52.
...
See Brander & Krugman, supra note 23.
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but this would not be a satisfactory strategy if the ultimate
goal is to understand the appropriate legal response to gray
markets. If price differences reflect differences in tastes and
costs, the response to gray marketing would be different from
the situation in which the price difference results from an
attempt by businesses to price discriminate between two
markets. In the former case, gray markets would almost
certainly be viewed as salutary because they provide a means
to integrate global markets. In the latter case, however, gray
markets would undermine attempts to develop regional
goodwill and expand markets to areas where the goods would
not be sold but for the price discrimination. The problem, from
the perspective of courts and legislatures, is that both these
factors will be present in almost all cases of price differences.
As an illustration of the benefits of price discrimination,
consider the following simple example."
Suppose a
manufacturer produces a drug which would be beneficial to
consumers. It can sell in either or both of two markets: one
relatively large with many substitutes for its product, the
other small with few substitutes. In order for the product to
be sold with profit in both markets, the price must be higher
in the small market than in the large market. If, however, by
law the producer was forced to sell the product at the same
price in the two markets, the producer would simply refuse to
sell in the smaller market. Therefore, given this all or nothing
possibility, price discrimination actually helps consumers as a
group, compared to the situation where the producer is forced
to sell its goods at one price. Note that in this example the
incentives for gray marketing exist if transportation costs are
not too high: the gray marketeer would buy in the low price
market and sell into the high price market. Gray marketing,
however, would erode price in the smaller market, cutting into
the producer's profits and creating the same incentives for
removing the product from the smaller market as a restriction
of non-price discrimination would. Therefore, the producer of
the drug must not only be allowed to price discriminate, but
must also, according to this argument, be allowed to "keep out

," The discussion of price discrimination and social welfare is based on
analysis in ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 22. See HAL

R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 248 (3d ed. 1993) (presenting a
technical analysis).
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the gray."
The producer of the drug can protect his interests by either
legislatively restricting the gray market or by controlling the
gray market through contract. Specifically, this Article shows
that the producer can preempt the gray market by setting the
price in the two markets in such a way that gray marketeers
would have no incentives, after taking into consideration the
transportation costs, to enter the market. The cost of this
"contractual preemption" is borne in part by the producer of
the good and in part by the consumers of the final product.
Arguably, this may be a cheaper alternative to legislative and
administrative schemes that are intended to keep gray market
goods from crossing the border, assuming a specific balance of
price differences and transportation costs. One result of this
economic analysis is a comparison of the costs and benefits of
contractual preemption with bans on gray market goods and
other judicial and legislative solutions to the gray market
problem.
3.3. InternationalTrade
The previous discussion of territorial divisions and price
discrimination was presented in a way that applies equally to
domestic or international markets. Gray markets, however,
have been exclusively an international issue. The question of
whether the analysis should be different in the context of
international markets rather than domestic markets remains
open. From an analytical perspective, the fact that gray
marketing occurs in international markets rather than
domestic markets is irrelevant from the point of view of
territorial restrictions; the same economic concepts,
transportation costs, consumer utility, and monopoly pricing
are applicable to both international markets and domestic
markets. Real world borders and nationalities are irrelevant
to the economic analysis.
This viewpoint demonstrates a potential pitfall to the
economic theory of gray markets. For actual gray markets,
international differences in intellectual property protection
and market structure are important for the policy responses
and the politics of gray market restrictions. The economic
analysis presented here will show that international
differences in the law will have an important role in
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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explaining how gray markets arise and, consequently, how
domestic legal institutions should respond to gray markets.
3.4.

Tademark Goods, Generics, and Gray Marketing

The formal model of gray markets builds on three
elements: (a) derivation of the demand curve for trademarked
products in each country; (b) description of how trademark
licensing occurs; and (c) description of international trade and
gray marketing.
For the purposes of this Section each of the two countries
will be assumed to have identical market structures, the focus
will be on one of the two countries.
There are two sectors in the market: the trademarked
sector and the generic sector.'
The generic sector is
assumed to be perfectly competitive, with average cost equal
to marginal cost of c. Therefore, the price of the generic good,
Pg, is e. The price of the trademarked good, Pt, is determined
in the trademark sector through the licensing arrangement
and the demand for the trademarked good.
The demand curve for both the trademarked and the
generic goods can be derived from the preferences of
consumers, which are taken as given. The preferences are
captured by each consumer's willingness to pay for the good.
For the sake of simplicity, assume that there are several
consumers, each of a different type, and index each type of
consumer by z, where z , [0, h/b], where h/b is defined below.
Each type of consumer is identical in her taste for the generic
good; each consumer is willing to pay up to one dollar for the
generic good. The demand for the trademarked good is more
complicated. Since the value of the trademark is derived from
the exclusiveness and status of the mark and the reduction in
search costs, the value of the trademark decreases as more
consumers buy the trademarked good."
To illustrate this

"S The analysis is a simplified, more intuitive discussion of the model
developed in Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, Counterfeit-ProductTrade,
78 AM. ECON. REV. 59 (1988): Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, Foreign
Counterfeiting of Status Goods, 103 Q.J. ECON. 79 (1988).
124 Even if there are no status effects, it is still the case that consumers
benefit from reduced search costs because of the use of trademarks.
However, if the trademark is overused in the market, the information value
of a particular mark is reduced and the mark may die because of
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economic fact, assume that each consumer z buys exactly one
unit of the trademarked good per period. If z individuals buy
the trademarked good, the willingness to pay of the marginal
consumer is given by
(1)

h-b.z

where "" represents the amount someone would be willing to
pay for the trademarked good if no one else were to buy it and
"b" represents how much the willingness to pay declines as
each additional consumer buys the good.
Consumers will buy either generic or trademarked
products, since the goods are identical except for their labels.
An individual consumer will buy a trademarked product if the
consumer surplus derived from the consumption of that
trademarked good is greater than the surplus derived from the
generic good. The marginal consumer, z1 ,is one who just
indifferent to the distinction between the trademark good and
the generic good. For this consumer, it must be the case that
(2)

h-b.z, -Pt

=

I -5 .

Rearranging equation (2) yields a relationship between the
price of the trademarked good and the amount of the good
consumed, (i.e, the demand curve for the product):
(2')

(h-l+cg) - b.z = Pt.

Calling the expression in parenthesis "a" and dropping the
subscript on z, the demand curve for the trademarked good can
be rewritten as follows:
(3)

a - b.z = Pt.

The owner of the trademark and the domestic and foreign
licensee of the trademark take the demand curve in formula
agenericide." Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the value of a
trademark should be a function of how much it is used, which can be valued
by the number of consumers who buy the trademarked product. For a
discussion of genericide and information costs, see Landes & Posner, supra

note 5.
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(3) as given in their profit maximization decisions. The
demand curve can be used positively to describe behavior and
normatively to assess the various policy responses to gray
marketing.
3.4.1. Trademark Licensing
The standard economic model of licensing assumes that the
trademark owner licenses the trademark to a distributor, who
in turn sells the good to the public." 5 In this model, the
distributor faces a market described by the demand curve in
formula (3). The licensor sets a licensing fee which consists of
two parts: (a) a royalty fee that charges r dollars per each unit
sold, and (b) a franchise fee F paid as a fixed cost to establish
the franchise. The licensor profits by manufacturing the
trademarked product at unit cost c, and then earning licensing
revenues paid by the distributor. The distributor profits by
buying the franchise contract and selling the goods in the
product market. The respective economic problems faced by
each agent can be presented as follows:
(4)

Licensee:
choose z to max: (a-b.z).z - r-z - F
Licensor:
choose r and F to max: (r-z+F) - c.z.

The standard solution to this problem is for the licensor to
charge the licensee a royalty fee equal to the marginal cost of
production, c, and to set the franchise fee equal to the amount
of profits earned by the licensee.
Substituting these
relationships into (4) yields the franchise problem:
(5)

choose z to max: (a-b.z).z-c.z.

Working through the mathematics yields the result that the
licensee will maximize profits by selling the trademarked good
at a price equal to (a+c)/2. Therefore, without trade the prices
of the trademarked and generic goods are as follows:

125

See TIROLE, supra note 22; Perry & Groff, supra note 119, at 189.
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Pt = (a+c)/2;

Pg

=

cg.

If the international economy were composed of independent
islands which do not trade goods among themselves and on
which goods were distributed through the franchise
arrangement described above, the prices of the trademarked
product and the generic product would be described fully by
equation (6). International trade makes price determination
more complicated.
3.4.2. InternationalTrade
If prices in the international economy on each of the
islands are defined completely by equation (6), then gray
markets would never arise. Prices would be identical on all of
the islands and there would be no room for arbitrage.
Equation (6), however, illustrates how international price
differences in the trademarked good arise. According to
equation (6), the trademarked goodwill be priced differently
because either the variable a or the variable c differs between
countries. That is differences in tastes or in costs of production
lead to a price difference. For the purpose of this discussion,
assume that price differences arise from differences in the
costs of production; none of the analysis changes if the price
differential arises from differences in tastes. This assumption
implies that the cost of producing generics goods is the same
in the two countries, but the cost of producing the
trademarked good is higher in one country than the other.
The cost difference may be due to differences in regulatory
regimes, the costs, or the technology used for the production of
the product. Using "d" to subscript the domestic market and
"f' to subscript the foreign market, the price of the
trademarked good in the two countries can be represented as:
(7)

Pt = (a+cd)/2;

Ptf = (a+cf)/ 2 .

A potential gray marketeer in this economic environment has
a clear incentive to arbitrage away the price difference. If "t"
represents per unit transportation costs, then the gray
marketeer will make a profit if he can buy the good at the
cheaper price, incur the transportation costs, and then sell the
good at the higher price. For the sake of argument, assume
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that the foreign market has the lower price. Then a profit
opportunity arises if:
(a+cd)/ 2 > (a+cf)/2 + t.

(8)

Alternatively, this condition can be written as:
(8')

(cd-cf)/ 2 > t.

The expression reported in (8') is a necessary condition for a
gray market to arise.
Gray marketing can lead to different responses by the
trademark licensee. One possibility is to stop all gray market
goods at the border. If such exclusion is successful, the result
will be the pricing in autarky as described by equation (7).
Another response is to contractually preempt the gray market
by setting the prices in the two markets so that no gray
marketing can occur. A third possibility exists where legal
institutions permit gray marketing, and the trademark
licensor creates a separate and independent division in the
foreign market. This situation corresponds to the type one and
type three cases in K Mart, in which the Supreme Court held
that gray market goods will be prohibited. A fourth and final
possibility is that the trademark licensor maintains its
affiliation with the foreign business entity, but due to
transaction costs cannot contractually preempt gray
marketing. What follows is an analysis of each of the potential
responses to gray marketing under the headings: autarky,
contractual preemption, gray marketing without common
control, and gray marketing with common control.
3.4.3. Autarky
Autarky is analytically the simplest case and is described
by equation (7) above. The autarky problem can be written as
a simple maximization problem. The purpose of writing a
formal maximization problem is for analytical convenience.
The autarky problem can be written as the maximization of
joint profits in the foreign and domestic markets, where 7rf and
7d represent foreign and domestic profits respectively:
max
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where the maximization problem is solved with respect to the
foreign and domestic prices of the trademarked good. The
economic intuition behind this result is that in each country
the trademark licensor and licensee are solving the franchise
problem described in (5). In equilibrium, the profits must be
as large as possible in each country, and this requirement is
equivalent to making the sum of profits as large as possible.
3.4.4. ContractualPreemption
Through contract, the trademark licensor can set the
licensing arrangement, and consequently the price in the two
markets, so that gray marketing will be preempted. Gray
marketing will not occur if the gray marketeer cannot
arbitrage away the price differences in the two markets after
taking into account transportation costs. Specifically, gray
marketing will not occur if:
(10)

Pd Pf + t.

The contract preemption problem can be written as:
(11)

max

(7Cf + 'Ed)

such that Pd < Pf + t.

In other words, the contract preemption problem is identical
to the autarky problem, except for the fact that there is a
mathematical restriction on the problem. Note that since
there is a restriction on the contract preemption problem, the
sum of profits in the contract preemption problem will be at
most the sum of profits in the autarky problem. Such a
limitation indicates that in terms of profits, the international
economy would be made worse off by contract preemption as
compared to the situation in autarky. However, the prices of
the trademarked products will also be different with contract
preemption than with autarky. Therefore, consumers in the
two economies will be affected differently by contract
preemption than by an autarky regime. Formal comparisons
of these situations are made in the following Sub-section.
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3.4.5. Gray Marketing Without Common Control
In this regime, gray marketing is permitted, and the
foreign and domestic business entities cannot contractually
preempt the market, because the domestic entity has no
control over the pricing policy of the foreign entity. Therefore,
each licensor-licensee entity in the two countries solves the
franchise problem independently of the problem in the other
country. The problem can be written as follows:
domestic economy: max z,,;
(12)
foreign economy: max irf such that demand for gray
marketing is internalized
Furthermore, gray marketing occurs to arbitrage the price
difference between the two countries after transportation costs.
Gray marketing has two effects qualitatively relative to
autarky: (a) an increase in the price in the foreign market,
since gray marketeers increase demand for the product and (b)
a decrease in price in the domestic market as gray marketeers
provide competition for the trademark licensee in the domestic
market. These two forces together tend to equalize prices in
the two markets net of transportation costs.
3.4.6. Gray Marketing With Common Control
In this regime, the foreign and domestic entities act in
concert to maximize joint profits, while internalizing the gray
market competition in the domestic economy. This regime
takes into consideration the strategic interaction between the
trademark licensor and the gray marketeer. Specifically, this
strategic interaction arises because the licensee fee
arrangement established in the foreign market will affect the
pricing in the domestic market. The formal problem can be
written as follows:
(13) max (7tf + 7rd), such that gray market is internalized

The difference between this problem and the one described in
(12) is that in (13), the trademark licensor internalizes the
effect of licensing in the foreign market into the price in the
domestic market. The result is that worldwide profits should
be higher in situations under common control than in
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss3/2
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situations under lacking common control, because
externality has been internalized.

the

3.5. Analytical Comparison of Four Regimes
The four different economic models discussed in the
previous Section correspond to the four different types of legal
regimes within which gray markets operate.
This
correspondence can be described as follows:
(a) Autarky: this corresponds to the legal regime in which
gray markets goods are prohibited from entering the domestic
market. The result is that foreign and domestic vendors sell
the product in their respective markets without the possibility
of resale.
(b) Contractual Preemption: this corresponds to the legal
regime in which the customs service and the courts are
ineffective in prohibiting gray market goods from entering the
domestic market. In response, the trademark owner sets the
licensing fees in the two countries in order to make gray
marketing impossible.
(c) Gray marketing without common control: this corresponds
to the legal regime in which gray marketing is permitted when
there is no common control of the domestic and foreign entities
and the two entities cannot effectively contract to prevent gray
marketing. Comparing the market under this regime and the
outcome under autarky illustrates the differences between
completely restricting gray marketing and allowing gray
marketing when the foreign and domestic entity cannot
contract with each other.
(d) Gray marketing with common control: this corresponds to
the legal regime in which gray marketing is permitted and the
foreign and domestic business entities are under common
control. Fruitful comparisons can be made between this
regime and the autarky regime, in which gray marketing is
effectively prohibited. Another useful comparison is with the
contractual preemption regime (b), in which gray marketing
can be controlled through contracting.
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The technical appendix establishes the formal model for
each of these four regimes and discusses how analytical
solutions were derived for the final market prices of the
trademarked good in the four regimes. This information is
summarized in table two. The notation is defined as follows:
domestic autarky price
domestic contract price
domestic common control price with gray
marketing
PdS = domestic price with gray marketing when entities
are separate
Pfa = foreign autarky price
Pda =
PdC =
Pdk =

Pfc = foreign contract price

Pf = foreign common control price with gray marketing
Pf. = foreign price with gray marketing when entities
are separate
In the discussion below, the symbol r will be used to denote
profits, and subscript characters will have the meanings noted
above. In addition, subscript "t" will be used to denote total or
worldwide profits, which is the sum of foreign and domestic
profits.
Comparisons of consumer welfare and firm profits can be
made by considering the differences in prices between the
different regimes. Two points raised by this model are worth
considering. First, consumer surplus unambiguously increases
when prices fall, which clearly demonstrated that consumers
prefer lower prices to higher prices. Second, profits may rise
or fall as prices change, indicating that the qualitative effect
on profits depends on the elasticity of demand.
The comparison among the four various regimes can be
summarized briefly. In the domestic market, prices under the
various regimes can be ranked as follows:
(14)

Pda > Pdc > Pdk > Pds

Domestic consumers favor most regimes in which the entities
are separate and gray marketing is allowed, and dislike most
autarky regimes, in which gray marketing is completely
prohibited. To illustrate this point, a set of prices for
hypothetical values of the parameters may be calculated.
These are presented in table two for both domestic and foreign
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss3/2
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consumers. Notice that the ranking of regimes for foreign
consumers will be slightly different:
(15)

Pf, > Pf. > Pe > Pf.

Foreign consumers prefer autarky regimes to contract-based
regime and prefer most of all regimes with separate entities
and gray marketing. The examples presented in table 2(b)
reflect this ranking.
Since the demand curve is a straight line in this model, the
effect of a price decline on profits can be easily determined.
Therefore, the difference between profits when the price is P1
and when the price is P0 can be expressed algebraically as
follows:
(16)

A = (xj- x0 )"(PI - c)
B = (Po
n

-

P1 ). x0 .
= A-B

Substituting for x0 and x, and using the expression for the
demand curve yields the following expression for (A-B):
(17)

1/b.(P-P 1 ).(P+Po) - a - c).

Since P0 > P 1, the sign of the difference in profits is the same
as the sign of (P1 +P 0 - a - c). Expressed algebraically, this is:
(18)

sign (7i - no) = sign [(P 1+Po) - (a+c)].

In this model, the effect of a price drop on profits can be
determined by examining the sign of the expression on the
right hand side of equation (18). With information on prices
from Table 2(a), foreign, domestic and worldwide profits may
be compared by using equation (18).
Without further information on the elasticity of demand
and the relative sizes of transportation costs and production
costs, it is not possible to analytically rank profits under the
four different regimes. Profits can, however, be partially
ranked as follows:
(19)
TOTAL PROFITS: t. > 7c; 2tk > 7CW; t. > 7rt.
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1da > rdk > lds; 7da > rdc

cfs > 7fa; ifs > nfk; 7fc > 7fa

In assessing the effect on profits, the threshold question is
whether the foreign and domestic firms are separate entities
or are under common control. If the entities are under
common control, it is not generally possible to show whether
the common entity has higher profits under autarky or under
a regime in which gray marketing is permitted. This difficulty
is attributable to the fact that even though the domestic entity
earns higher profits under autarky, the foreign entity earns
higher profits under a regime of gray marketing when the
entities are under common control. The reason for this
ambiguity is that gray marketing actually increases demand
in the foreign market, which in turn increases profits in that
market. Therefore, if the entities are under common control,
the domestic firm can expand its profits at the expense of
profits earned by the foreign firm.
Under a regime of separate control, however, total
worldwide profits will be unambiguously higher under autarky
than under a regime where gray marketing is permitted. As
under a regime of common control, there is a distributional
difference between an autarky and a regime that allows gray
marketing. Foreign firms will prefer regimes that permit gray
marketing while domestic firms will autarky. Therefore, as
when the entities are under common control, a domestic
restriction of gray marketing will come at the expense of
foreign firms. Similarly, contractual preemption regimes also
demonstrate this ambiguity. While worldwide profits are
higher under autarky than under contractual preemption
regimes, domestic firms prefer autarky while foreign firms
prefer contractual preemption regimes.' 26
Finally, it is not possible to compare contractual

"" It should be noted that both parties could be made better off by
moving to a regime of autarky if domestic firms could make side payments
to foreign firms to compensate them for lost profits. In general, these side
payments would be possible only if transaction costs were low, which would
be true, for example, if the foreign and domestic firms were under common
control. But as discussed in the previous paragraph, it is generally not
possible to determine in common control regimes whether worldwide profits
are greater under gray marketing or under autarky.
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preemption regimes of gray marketing regimes either with or
without common control. This inability to compare profits is
not a problem, however, since the regimes are mutually
exclusive. If the transaction costs of contracting are low
enough, foreign and domestic firms can set prices to preempt
the gray market altogether. On the other hand, if transaction
costs are prohibitive, preemption will not be possible.
Therefore, a comparison between contractual preemption
regimes and gray marketing regimes would not be meaningful.
The previous comparisons have divided the regimes into
those with common control and those without common control.
Another distinction can be drawn between common control and
separate ownership. If transaction costs prevent contractual
preemption of the gray market, domestic and foreign firms can
either create administrative and legal barriers to gray market
goods that will lead to autarky, or they can operate in the
shadow of gray marketing. If courts and legislatures do not
provide protection against gray markets, the comparisons in
equation (19) show that total profits are greater under common
control than under separate control. The reason for this is
that the gray market creates an externality in the setting of
the licensing fee in the two markets. Since gray markets
respond to price differences between two markets, the price of
the licensing fee in the foreign market will affect the amount
of gray market goods that enter the domestic market. Under
common control, this externality can be internalized since the
domestic and foreign entities will collude to set licensing fees
in both markets by taking into consideration the size of the
externality. As a result, worldwide profits will be higher
under a regime of common control. Once again, domestic firms
will benefit at the expense of foreign firms, since foreign
profits are greater if the entities are separate while domestic
profits are greater if the entities are under common control.
This discussion of profits raises several points about policy
responses to gray marketing. First, the litigation against gray
market goods is pursued by domestic firms under the autarky
model because they have higher profits under a regime of
autarky than under any of the other regimes. At least in the
administrative area, however, the protection accorded to
domestic firms hinges upon the corporate relationship between
the domestic and foreign entities. If transaction costs are not
prohibitive, the domestic and foreign entities can contractually
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preempt the gray market. This rationale justifies the decision
in K Mart, which denies protection to firms in a parentsubsidiary relationship. However, the presumption of low
transaction costs is unrealistic. It is more likely that
transaction costs will be high and that the foreign and
domestic firms will operate in the shadow of gray markets. In
a world where gray markets can neither be preempted nor
legally banned, it is to the advantage of domestic firms to act
in concert with foreign firms through a system of common
ownership. This is the ultimate tension in the gray market
problem: domestic firms are torn between an outright ban on
gray market goods, and a regime in which gray markets are
permitted but under which domestic and foreign firms act
under common control to internalize the externalities created
by gray markets. Ultimately, the gray market problem reflects
a failure of coordination between domestic firms and foreign
entities.
In light of this analysis, what alternative should policy
makers select among the different responses to gray
marketing?
The following Section discusses what the
preceding analytical results reveal about various policy
options.
Should the state, through the Customs Service and the
courts,prohibitgray markets, orshould control ofgray markets
be left to the contractual relationship between foreign and
domestic businesses?
This question involves a comparison of autarky regimes
with contractual preemption regimes. Domestic consumers
prefer contractual regimes to autarky, while foreign consumers
have the opposite preference. Worldwide profits are lower
under contractual preemption regimes, and there is a
distributional difference between the two types of regimes as
well. The key policy question is whether the gains in
consumer welfare gained by requiring businesses to preempt
gray markets outweigh the losses in profits that firms will face
under contractual preemption regime. Because trademark
laws have a pro-consumer inclination, contractual preemption
is the preferred solution. Since gray marketing costs are borne
almost exclusively by domestic firms, it would be more
equitable to place the burden of preventing gray markets on
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss3/2
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those firms than on society as a whole.
Should the courts adopt different standardsfor regulating
gray markets based on whether the entities are commonly
controlled?
Under the K Mart doctrine, gray marketing is allowed if
the entities are under common control but not if they are
separate. The result is a dual regime in which markets with
common control are described by the model of gray marketing
with common control and markets without common control are
essentially described by the autarky model. This distinction
leads to several discrepancies. First, businesses may attempt
to reduce the appearance of common control by spinning off
subsidiaries or by establishing third party shells through
which trademark rights are licensed. Second, there is a
distortion between goods sold through separate entities and
those sold through entities under common control. The
current regime provides a subsidy to goods sold through
separate entities. Finally, since domestic consumers prefer the
gray marketing regime without common control to the other
three types of regimes, the distinction drawn in K Mart is
misguided.
Consumer welfare would be improved by
abandoning the distinction between the two regimes and
allowing gray marketing regardless of the corporate
relationship between the foreign and domestic entities.
Will permitting gray marketing lead domestic or foreign
trademark owners to abandon overseas markets?
The discussion of price discrimination above noted that
price discrimination between two markets is sometimes
necessary in order to guarantee that smaller markets are
served. However, price discrimination alone is insufficient to
accomplish this goal; territorial restrictions such as
restrictions on gray markets are also necessary. To the extent
that this model of price discrimination applies to gray
markets, allowing gray markets may in fact lead to the
abandonment of overseas markets. This analysis suggests,
however, that incentives to abandon will not arise, since
foreign markets still provide profits for domestic trademark
owners. Unless these overseas enterprises become moneyPublished by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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losing ventures, incentives for overseas investment will
continue to exist.
What if gray market goods are materially different?
An element thus far ignored by this analysis is the
possibility that domestic goods and gray market goods may
differ in quality. The potential harm to purchasers from
purchasing gray market goods of lower quality than their
domestic counterparts may militate against allowing gray
market goods to enter the domestic market. The technical
appendix shows that under the assumptions of this model,
quality differences could make consumers worse off through
gray marketing. This problem could, however, be alleviated by
proper labeling of gray market goods, which would remove the
uncertainty associated with their purchase. Therefore, even if
gray market goods were materially different, consumers would
fare better under a regime where gray marketing was
permitted but the goods were properly labeled.
3.6. Summary
This Section provides a formal economic model of the
various economic issues raised by gray markets. Its purpose
is to assess the various legal arguments that are made for and
against gray marketing.
The model presented, though
obviously simplified, captures many essential elements of gray
markets: licensing, transportation costs, demand goods with
for trademarks versus generic goods, and material difference.
It is important to note that governments always have the
option to leave gray markets unregulated, relying instead on
contractual preemption by business entities to provide control
over the market. While contractual preemption leads to lower
global profits for the businesses, it appropriately places the
cost of regulating gray markets on the parties that directly
benefit from such regulation. Even if contractual preemption
is impossible due to high transaction costs, unregulated gray
marketing is still preferable to regulated gray marketing from
the perspective of consumers.
The one caveat is that
consumers would benefit from proper labels for gray market
goods. Therefore, this analysis provides a rationale for the
New York and California legislative responses to gray
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marketing as well as the proposed legislation by Senator Orrin
Hatch.1 21
The discussion of consumer welfare rested on the
assumption that foreign consumers do not count in social
welfare from the perspective of domestic policy, which is not
an unreasonable assumption. Foreign profits were, however,
explicitly considered. This asymmetry is justified since one
issue raised by gray marketing is the incentive for
international business entities to come under common control;
the preceding analysis provides a basis for understanding
when common control is appropriate. While asymmetry makes
it difficult to assess the harmonization of intellectual property
laws, this model nevertheless does allow for the comparison of
foreign and domestic economies.
4.

CONCLUSION

Economic arguments play an important role in many legal
debates. This is exemplified by the discussion of gray markets,
which raises questions involving the economics of international
trade and intellectual property. There has been, however, very
little formal economic analysis of the gray marketing problem
or the intellectual property issues raised in this Article.
Consequently, no systematic analysis has yet carried over into
the legislative or judicial debates. This Article represents an
important first step in providing such an analysis. It is hoped
that the models described will provide the basis for a more
rational and systematic discussion of the economic issues
raised by gray marketing.
As the discussion of the case law illustrates, domestic firms
have pursued several means of restricting gray markets. In
the context of administrative remedies, the U.S. Supreme
Court has based protection against gray markets on the
corporate relationship between the domestic and foreign
entities, depending upon whether or not they are under
common control. In the context of the preceding model, this
distinction is at least somewhat logical. If gray marketing
occurs, firms under common control achieve higher profits
than if the firms were under separate ownership. In this
sense firms under common control are hurt less by gray
127

See supra text accompanying note 102.
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marketing than firms that are not under common control.
This analysis, however, adopts the wrong baseline.
Domestic firms unquestionably prefer an outright ban on gray
markets to all other possible regimes. Foreign firms, however,
favor gray markets because the presence of gray markets
increases consumer demand in the foreign market. These
conflicting tendencies result in a tension between the policy
goals of domestic and foreign firms. The K Mart decision
assumes that firms under common control can resolve
coordination problems through the side payments between
domestic and foreign entities. Even if side payments can be
made, the issue of whether gray marketing should occur
remains unresolved. Under current law, the legislative and
judicial searching for restrictions on gray markets reflect an
attempt by domestic firms to increase their domestic profits at
the expense of foreign firms. This Article suggests that a
global perspective may be needed in order to develop a more
comprehensive response to the gray marketing problem.
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DERIVATIONS OF PRICES IN FOUR REGIMES

Autarky
For the technical discussion of this regime, I will not use
the subscripts to represent the foreign and domestic
economies.
In each country, the trademark licensee solves the
following problem:
(1) max by choosing x:
(a-b.x).x - r.x - F

The solution to this problems yields market output as a
function of r and F and market price as a function of r and F.
These functions are respectively x(rF) and P(r,F).
The trademark licensor solves the following problem:
(2) max by choosing r and F:
r-x(r,F) + F - c.x(rF)

Solving these problems yields the prices listed in Table Two.
ContractualPre-emption
In this problem, the licensee fees in the two countries are
set in order to make gray marketing unprofitable. Each
country solves the licensing problem as discussed above. This
means that in each country, output and price will be functions
of the royalty and licensing fee in each country, Explicitly, in
each country
(3)
xd = xd(rd,Fd)
Pd = Pd(rd,Fd)

xf = x(rfFf)
Pf = P r.Ff)

TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.

[Vol. 15:3

The profit maximization problem can be written as follows:
(4)

max by choosing rfrd,FfFd:

(rfxf + Ff - cf-xf)
such that Pd(rd,Fd) = P(rfFf) + t
(rd.xd+Fd

-

Cd'Xd) +

The autarky problem is the problem described in (4) without
the restriction on final prices.
Gray Marketing
Gray marketing results in the entry of foreign goods into
the domestic market. Let g be the amount of foreign goods that
enter into and compete with the domestic market. The price
in the domestic market is determined as follows:
(5)

Pd =

a - b.(Xd+g).

Gray market goods will enter until the profit to gray
marketeers is driven to zero, or
(6)

Pd = Pf + t.

Combining (5) and (6) yields one equation to determine output
in the domestic market:
(7)

a - b.(xd+g) = Pf + t.

The domestic trademark licensee solves the following problem:
(8) max by choosing xa:
(a - b.(xd+g)).xd-r-Xd-F.

Taking (7) and (8) together yields functions for domestic
production,x, gray market output,g, and domestic price Pd, as
functions of rd and Fd.
In the foreign market, the gray marketeers will increase
the demand for the final product. To incorporate the demand,
re-write the demand curve for the product as a function of Pf.
This expression is
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(9) x g(rd,Fd) = a/b - 1/b. Pf.

The foreign trademark licensee's problem is
(10) max by choosing xf:
(a-b.(xf+g)).xf - rrxf -Ff.

Notice that because the gray market demand enters both the
foreign and domestic profit maximization problem, the foreign
output and market price will be affected by the licensing fee
set in the domestic economy as well as the fee set in the
foreign economy. This is the externality mentioned in the text
of the Article. The difference between the common control and
separate entity cases is whether this externality is taken into
consideration in the profit maximization problem.
No Common Control
In this case, the trademark licensors in the two countries
solve the profit maximization problems separately. In the
domestic economy, the problem is
(11) max by choosing rd and

Fd:
rd'Xd(rd,Fd) + Fd - c d. Xd(rd,Fd).

In the foreign economy, the problem is:
(12) max by choosing rf and Ff:
rf.xrd,Fd,rf,Ff) + Ff - crxXrd,Fd,rfFf).

Notice in this case that the domestic trademark licensor is not
taking into consideration the effect of its choices of rd and F d
on the foreign output and price.
Common Control
In this case, the trademark licensors do take into
consideration the externality resulting from the setting of the
licensing fees. The common control problem is
(13) max by choosing rd,Fd,rf)Ff.
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[rd'Xd(rd,Fd) + Fd - Cd" Xd(rd,Fd)]
+ [rrx(rd,Fd,rfFf) + Ff - crxfrd,Fd,rfFf)]
Since the common control problem internalizes the externality,
global profits and prices should be higher.
MaterialDifferences
If the gray market goods are not perfect substitutes for the
domestically produced goods, then a domestic consumer will
buy a gray market good for the same price as the trademarked
domestic good but obtain a lower level of utility. Suppose s is
the probability that a consumer will buy a gray market good
thinking it is the genuine good; therefore, (1-s) is the
probability that the good is the actual trademarked good. The
expected utility gain from buying a trademarked good is
(14) (1-s).[h-b.z-P t ] + s.[l - Pt].

This expression assumes that the consumer gets a utility from
gray market goods identical to what he would receive from
purchasing a generic good because, for example, neither
provides the same warranty or quality assurances as the
trademark good. For the inframarginal consumer in this case,
it must be that
(15) (1-s).[h-b.z-Pt] + s.[l - Pt] = 1 - c.

The resulting demand curve is
(16) (1-s).(h-1) + cg - b.(1-s).z = Pt.

Comparing this demand curve with the one derived in the text
shows that if gray market goods are materially different, the
main change is that the demand curve is flatter and has a
This means that qualitatively the
lower intercept.
comparisons of profits across the four regimes will be identical
in the material difference case than in the case where gray
market goods and domestic goods are perfect substitutes.
However, consumers will be worse off with gray marketing
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol15/iss3/2

1994]

GRAYMARKETS

than in the autarky case because the demand curve has shifted
in and therefore consumer surplus has been reduced.
This problem can however can better be remedied by
allowing gray marketing but labelling gray market goods as
different from the domestically produced trademark goods if in
fact they are materially different, i.e. because of differences in
quality or other attributes such as warranties. With labelling,
consumers will not face the uncertainty described above and
the resulting demand curve will be the one derived in the text.
Once the basic uncertainty is removed, the analysis in the text
will apply.
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TABLE ONE: Summary of Cases
I

TYPE

RESULT

THEORY

watches

2a

DNI

§ 526

photo

2b

DNI

j 526

2a

DNI

§ 526

shirts

3

DNI

§ 42

photo

2a

I

§§42 & 43

CASE

DATE

PRODUCT

K Mart

S.Ct 1988

Vivitar

Fed 1985

equipment

Olympus

2nd 1986

photo equipment

Daewood

9th 1983

Mamiya

EDNY 1982

equipment

Granada

2nd 1987

dolls

3

I

§ 42

NEC

9th 1987

computer

2a

DNI

§ 42
§42

chips

Lever Bros.

DC 1989

soap

2c

DNI

Yamaha

DC 1990

music
equipment

2a

DNI

Ferrero

3d 1991

candy

3

I

§ 42

Weil
Ceramics

3d 1989

clay
figurines

2a

DNI

§§42 & 43

Scorpio

3d 1984

records

3

I

§ 42 &
§ 526

§1602 &
109

Sebastian

3d 1988

hair care

3

DNI

BMG Music

9th 1991

records

§§602 &
109

products

3

I

§§602 &
109

Red Baron

4th 1992

video games
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TABLE I LEGEND:
Type:
(1)= U.S firm bought rights from foreign
firm
(2a)= U.S. firm subsidiary of foreign parent
(2b)= U.S. firm parent of foreign subsidiary
(2c)= U.S. firm and foreign firm same
(3)= foreign firm bought rights from U.S. firm
Result:
DNI= Gray market goods did not infringe
I= Gray market goods infringed
IOPR = Gray market goods infringed on
performance right
Theory: § 526= Tariff Act
§§ 42, 43= Lanham Act
§§ 602, 109= Copyright Act/First Sale Doctrine
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TABLE TWO: Price Comparisons of the Four Regimes
2(a): Analytical Comparison

T

Domestic

Foreign

Autarky

(a+Cd)/ 2

(a+cf)/2

Contract

a/2+cd/4 +c/ 4 +t/ 2

a/2 +cd 4 +c/ 4 +t/ 2

Gray Market No
Common Control

a/3+c/2+2t/3

a/3+c/2-t/3

Gray Market
Common Control

a/ 2 +(3crCd)/ 4 +t

a/2+(3crcd)/4

Regime
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2(b): Numerical example (a=30; Cd=2 4 ;f=1 8 ;t=2 )
Regime

]

Domestic

J

Foreign

Autarky

$27

$24

Contract

$26.50

$24.50

Gray Market No

$20.33

$18.33

$24.50

$22.50

Common Control

Gray Market
Common Control
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